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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

78-12-22

ARTICLE 2
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY
78-12-22. Within eight years.
Within eight years:
an action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United Stat'es or
of any state or territory within the United States.
an action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure. to
provide support or maintenance for dependent children.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-22; L. 1975, ch. 96, § 26.
Cross-References. - Execution to issue
within eight years, Rule 69(a), U.R.C.P.
Judgment a lien for eight years, § 78-22-1.

Uniform Act on Paternity,§ 78-45a-1 et seq.
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
§ 78-45-1 et seq.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act § 77-31-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Judgments or decrees.
Paternity proceedings.
Pleadings.
Stipulations.
Support or maintenance.
Tolling.
Judgments or decrees.
Where judgment was rendered in favor of
creditor in an action founded on contract, the
debt did not thereafter retain its original character as a contract debt, but a new cause of
action on the judgment was substituted, and
the statute of limitation with respect to judgments applied to an action to renew the judgment. Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402
P.2d 696 (1965).
This section was not a bar to an action to
impress judgment lien on property where complaint alleged that property had been transferred to defraud creditors, and that property
was held in trust for defendant. Moulton v.
Morgan, 115 Utah 119, 202 P.2d 723 (1949).
Where judgment payable in installments
provided that plaintiff could have execution for
total amount due if default in payments should
be made, plain intent was that execution
should issue for only such amounts as were due
at time of default so that statute did not begin
to run from date of default. Buell v. Duchesne
Mercantile Co., 64 Utah 391,231 P. 123 (1924).
In case of a judgment payable in installments, statute runs from time fixed for payment of each installment for the part then payable, and not from date of the judgment. Buell

v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 Utah 391, 231
P. 123 (1924).
Notwithstanding former § 104-37-6 permitting enforcement of judgment after lapse of
eight years, an action upon a money judgment
could not be brought after expiration of eight
years. Youngdale v. Burton, 102 Utah 169, 128
P.2d 1053 (1942).
Mortgage foreclosure decree could not be collaterally attacked for mortgagee's failure to
serve proper represen·tative of estate of decreased mortgagor, where defendants in that
action defaulted, no appeal was taken and foreclosure decree had become final, and where
foreclosure record did not show such error or
defect on its face; this section afforded no defense to subsequent action to quiet title instituted by mortgagee who purchased at foreclosure sale. Zion's Benefit Bldg. Soc'y v. Geary,
112 Utah 548, 189 P.2d 964 (1948).
Judgment may be sued upon if the action is
brought within the 8-year statute oflimitation;
the limitation does not bar renewal or revival
of the judgment by filing an action within the
prescribed period. Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d
1322 (Utah 1979).
In actions for fraud, statute does not begin to
run until fraud is discovered or could have
been reasonably discovered, but even when ac-
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tion is not based on fraud, in equity where
cause of action is concealed from one in whom
it resides by the one against whom it lies, the
statute will not run. Attorney Gen. v. Pomeroy,
93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 114 A.L.R. 726
(1937).
Statute of limitations begins to run from
time of the rendition and entry of judgment or
decree. Sweetser y. Fox, 43 Utah 40, 134 P.
599, 47 L.R.A. (n.s.) 145, 1916C Ann. Cas. 620
(1913).

Paternity proceedings.
This section imposes no time limitation upon
the institution of a suit to establish paternity
and enforce an obligation for support arising
on account thereof. Nielsen v. Hansen, 564
P.2d 1113 (Utah 1977).
Pleadings.
Trial court did not abuse discretion in permitting defendants to amend answer to set up
defense of limitations at conclusion of plaintiffs evidence, where defendants, as condition
of amendment, agreed to pay costs from time of
first answer to time of offering amendment. Attorney Gen. v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d
1277, 114 A.L.R. 726 (1937).
Complaint based on judgment is timely under this section though filed one day after expiration of eight-year limitation period where
previous day was Sunday, in view of former
§§ 88-2-7 and 88-2-8 (Code 1943). Nelson v.
Jorgenson, 66 Utah 360, 242 P. 945 (1926).
Stipulations.
Parties to contract may stipulate for period

of limitations shorter than that fixed by statute oflirnitations. Clark v. Lund, 55 Utah 284,
184 P. 821 (1919).

Support or maintenance.
The eight-year statute of limitations applies
to past due unpaid installments for alimony or
support of minor children, and therefore execution may issue only for the arrearages accumulated within a period of eight years. Seeley v.
Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975).
A Utah action brought in 1978 to enforce a
1975 Ohio action for support arrearages, which
also included a 1967 Ohio action for support
arrearages, was timely filed under this section.
Logan v. Schneider, 609 P.2d 943 (Utah 1980).
Tolling.
Action to renew a judgment brought more
than eight years after the date of entry of the
original judgment was barred by this section
even though defendant had signed a written
agreement acknowledging the obligation and
had made some payments thereon less than
eight years before commencement of the action. The common-law rule which tolled the
limitation period in case of acknowledgment or
part payment is limited by § 78-12-44 so that
it now applies only to contract actions.
Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d
696 (1965).
In action by administrator, indebtedness created by check was held to be barred, and statute was not tolled by unauthorized acts of
plaintiff. Bingham v. Walker )3ros., Bankers,
75 Utah 149, 283 P. 1055 (1929).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 24 Arn. ,Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation §§ 1073, 1074; 46 Arn. Jur. 2d
Judgments § 897 et seq.
C.J.S. - 27C C.J.S Divorce §§ 684 to 693;
50 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 854, 871; 67A C.J.S.
Parent and Child §§ 73 to 89.
A.L.R. - Statute of limitations: effect of de-

78-12-23.

------

lay in appointing administrator or other representative on cause of action accruing at or after
death of person in whose favor it would have
accrued, 28 A.L.R.3d 1141.
Key Numbers. - Divorce 'P 311; Judgment
<p 910, 934; Parent and Child <p 3.3(4), 3.4(2).

Within six years - Mesne profits of real property - Instrument in writing - Distribution of
criminal proceeds to victim.

Within six years:
(1) an action for the mesne profits of real property.
(2) an action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing, except those mentioned in § 78-12-22.
(3) an action instituted under § 78-11-12.5 regarding distribution of
criminal proceeds to any victim.
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-23; L. 1984, ch. 16, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1984 amendment added Subsection (3).

78-12-23

Cross-References. - Product Liability Act,
statute of limitations, § 78-15-3.
Promise to pay extends period, § 78-12-44.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Breach of contract.
Breach of warranty.
Contractor's bond.
Corporate mismanagement action.
Corporate stock purchase.
Instrument in writing.
Insurance policy.
Judgment lien.
Mortgage foreclosures.
Open account.
Pleadings.
Promise to return amount paid on note.
Running of statute.
Surety bonds.
Tolling.
Torts.
Waiver.
Cited.
Breach of contract.
Action for damages to property growing out
of city's construction of canal over right of way,
granted to city in consideration of city's covenant to do work so as not to damage grantor's
property, was action for breach of contract, and
hence limitation on action was controlled by
this section. Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt
Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 405 (1935).
Where parties entered into contract whereby
defendant was to ship goods to plaintiff at a
specific price "f.o.b." York, Penn., and plaintiff
instructed defendant to ship some of the goods
to a point close to York, freight collect, and
then plaintiff paid the freight and also paid
defendant the specific price for the goods, an
action by plaintiff to recover the freight
charges that he paid was founded on a contract
rather than an action to recover money paid
under mistake. Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1
Utah 2d 320, 266 P.2d 494 (1954).
Where land contract contained no provision
for return of payments in case seller should
default, purchaser's action for payments was as
one for money had and received, and consequently four-year limitation on actions for relief not otherwise provided for was applicable
rather than predecessor to this section. Brown
v. Cleverly, 93 Utah 54, 70 P.2d 881 (1938),
distinguished, Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1
Utah 2d 320, 266 P.2d 494 (1954).
Duty of stockholder to pay company's taxes
arose out of implied contract and not an ex-

press contract; accordingly, it was not governed by this section. Petty & Riddle, Inc. v.
Lunt, 104 Utah 130, 138 P.2d 648 (1942), distinguished, Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1
Utah 2d 320, 266 P.2d 494 (1954).
Breach of warranty.
Suit based on breach of warranty in contract
for sale of horse was governed by this section,
and not by§ 78-12-26. Clark v. Lund, 55 Utah
284, 184 P. 821 (1919).
Contractor's bond.
This section is applicable to an action by an
unpaid materialman to recover from a subcontractor or his surety on a bond executed at the
request of the prime contractor. Arnold Mach.
Co. v. Prince, 550 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976).
Corporate mismanagement action.
Three-year statute of limitation under
§ 78-12-27 was applicable to violation by directors of corporation grounded upon failure to
meet requirements of Investment Company
Act of 1940, notwithstanding argument that
since personal check, promissory note and
stock certificates were written indicia of agreement, statute providing six-year limitation period for action based upon written contract
should have been applied. Esplin v. Hirschi,
402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 928, 89 S. Ct. 1194, 22 L. Ed. 2d 459
(1969).
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Corporate stock purchase.
This section was applicable to action on written obligation of one who united with several
others to purchase corporate stock, in which all
were interested in proportion to number of
shares subscribed for. McMillan v. Whitley, 38
Utah 452, 113 P. 1026 (1911).
Instrument in writing.
A cause of action is "founded" upon an instrument in writing, so as to be subject to this
section, when the contract, obligation or liability grows out of the written instrument, not
remotely or ultimately, but immediately; section would have same meaning if word
"founded" was deleted. Bracklein v. Realty Ins.
Co., 95 Utah 490, 80 P.2d 471 (1938).
Farmer's obligation to pay for work performed in leveling a portion of his land was
founded upon a written instrument and thus
governed by six-year statute of limitations under this section rather than four-year period
under§ 78-12-25 where, after preliminary negotiations and oral estimate, parties executed
a written instrument, stating the price to be
paid, in form of documents supplied by federal
agency which was paying portion of cost.
Evans v. Pickett Bros. Farms, 28 Utah 2d 125,
499 P.2d 273 (1972).
Written lien on real estate granted by aged
couple to division of public welfare in order to
qualify for old-age assistance and to secure reimbursement of moneys paid by division was
not "obligation created by statute" but was
rather an "obligation based upon an instrument in writing" and hence was subject to a
six-year statute of limitations. Juab County
Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Summers, 19 Utah 2d
49, 426 P.2d 1 (1967).
Insurance policy.
Recovery on health and accident policy was
barred where action was not filed until 32
years after loss. Amundson v. Mutual Benefit
Health & Accident Ass'n, 13 Utah 2d 407, 375
P.2d 463 (1962).
Action to recover automatic insurance benefits on war risk insurance which accrued in
1917 was barred by this statute, where claim
was not presented to bureau until 1931, and
suit was not brought until 1932, more than six
years after accrual of action. United States v.
Preece, 85 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1936).
Judgment lien.
Statute was not a bar to action to impress
judgment lien on property, where complaint alleged that property had been transferred to defraud creditors, and that property was held in
trust for defendant. Moulton v. Morgan, 115
Utah 119, 202 P.2d 723 (1949).
Mortgage foreclosures.
Mortgage foreclosure proceedings are gov-

erned by this section. Crompton v. Jenson, 78
Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931).
Liability pursuant to purchaser's assumption of mortgage on real estate was "founded
upon an instrument in writing" and thus subject to six-year limitation prescribed by this
section where deed contained an assumption
clause; fact that purchaser did not sign deed
and that assumption clause was inserted pursuant to his prior oral promise to pay mortgage
note did not render liability one "not founded
upon an instrument in writing" so as to be subject to four-year limitation of § 78-12-25.
Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., 95 Utah 490, 80
P.2d 471 (1938).
This section prescribes the limitation for
bringing action to foreclose corporate mortgage
securing its bonds. Weir v. Bauer, 75 Utah 498,
286 P. 936 (1930).
Junior mortgagee or grantee may invoke
this section when statute has run against prior
grantee or mortgagee. Crompton v. Jenson, 78
Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931).
In an action to foreclose on a note secured by
a mortgage, the defense of !aches was not
available, even though foreclosure is an equity
action, where the six-year statute of limitations on obligations in writing had two years
yet to run when the action was commenced.
F.M.A. Fin. Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80,
404 P.2d 670 (1965).
Though tax deed through which defendant
claimed was inoperative to convey good title,
this did not prevent defendant from invoking
aid of statute of limitations in suit by mortgagee to foreclose mortgage, since equitable •
lien acquired by payment of taxes gave defendant interest in property. Graves v. Seifried, 31
Utah 203, 87 P. 674 (1906).

Open account.
The statute oflimitations governing open accounts(§ 78-12-25), not this section governing
written contracts, was applicable to a claim by
a warehouse owner and retail distributor
against a tire company, alleging that the company had breached an agreement to ship merchandise through the plaintiffs warehouse
whenever possible, since the parties had engaged in a series of transactions in which the
warehouse owner was debited for the tires it
purchased and credited for its commissions,
which constituted an "open account." Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pearson, 769 F.2d 1471
(10th Cir. 1985).
Pleadings.
Where complaint was filed and no summons
was issued, amended complaint filed seven
years thereafter was not barred by this section,
since original complaint constituted commencement of action, and it not having proceeded to its merits or not being dismissed was
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still pending. Askwith v. Ellis, 85 Utah 103, 38
P.2d 757 (1934).
If plaintiff claims that bar of this statute was
tolled or otherwise inapplicable, he must plead
and prove same. Clawson v. Boston Acme
Mines Dev. Co., 72 Utah 137, 269 P. 147, 59
A.L.R. 1318 (1928).
Where complaint was filed within period of
limitations, action was not barred, notwithstanding summons was not served until after
such period had expired. Keyser v. Pollock, 20
Utah 371, 59 P. 87 (1899).

Promise to return amount paid on note.
Six-year, and not four-year, statute oflimitations held applicable to action by landowners
to recover from real estate brokers amount
owners were compelled to pay on note which
brokers promised in writing would be returned
to them. Kennedy v. Griffith, 98 Utah 183, 95
P.2d 752 (1939).
Running of statute.
Mere dissolution of partnership did not of itself give rise to a cause of action in partners so
as to start running of statute; absent proof to
establish claim was barred by statute of limitations, it was error to nonsuit plaintiff in his
action for accounting. Kimball v. McCornick,
70 Utah 189, 259 P. 313 (1927).
In action for breach of warranty as to quality
of certain elevators to be installed, where contract of 1912 expressly provided that elevator
company should retain title until elevators
were accepted and paid for, held action for
breach of warranty commenced in 1919 was
not barred by six-year statute of limitations, in
view of fact that elevators were not accepted
and paid for until 1915. M.H. Walker Realty
Co. v. American Sur. Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P.
998 (1922).
In action for breach of warranty as to quality, statute of limitations does not begin to run
until there is sale of article warranted. M.H.
Walker Realty Co. v. American Sur. Co., 60
Utah 435, 211 P. 998 (1922).
Statute oflimitations begins to run on action
on breach of warranty of title from time of eviction, and when title is in United States, from
time purchaser recognized and yielded to such
paramount title, so that such an action was not
barred by this section where it was commenced
within year after purchaser found that title
was in United States. East Canyon Land &
Stock Co. v. Davis & Weber Counties Canal
Co., 65 Utah 560, 238 P. 280 (1925).
This section did not bar depositor's action
against bank on certificate of deposit, even
though depositor had left funds with bank for
fifteen years during which time a third party
wrongfully cashed the certificate, since depositor had no cause of action, and statute did not
begin running, until he demanded payment.

78-12-23

Esponda v. Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 117,
283 P. 729 (1929).
Attorney's written receipt for promissory
notes, delivered to him for collection, held, for
purposes of limitations, to have constituted
contract; client's right of action against attorney, in matter of notes not accounted for by
him, did not begin to run until attorney refused or failed to return notes on demand
therefor. Stevens v. Rogers, 16 Utah 105, 51 P.
261 (1897).
A covenant against encumbrances in warranty deed is, in effect, a covenant to indemnify where encumbrance is charge or lien
against land which can be extinguished by
payment, and hence statute of limitations begins to run when grantee is damnified so that
action by grantee to recover amount paid to
extinguish tax lien brought within six years
from time of payment, but more than six years
from time deed was given, was not barred by
limitations. Soderberg v. Holt, 86 Utah 485, 46
P.2d 428, 99 A.L.R. 1041 (1935).
A cause of action for a breach of a covenant
against encumbrances in a warranty deed remains viable for six years after the grantee
first receives notice, either actual or constructive, of an encumbrance against his property.
Christiansen v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 590
P.2d 1251 (Utah 1979).
On insolvency of building and loan association and appointment of receiver to wind up
affairs, mortgage indebtedness of borrowing
members became immediately due and collectible by receiver, and statute of limitations
began to run against mortgage from that time.
Graves v. Seifried, 31 Utah 203, 87 P. 674
(1906).
In action by pledgee to recover loss sustained
when it accepted shares of defendant's stock as
pledgee, which stock was void because representing an overissue procured through fraud,
statute of limitations did not begin to run until
infirmity in certificate was discovered or, by
reasonable diligence, could have been discovered; fact that no assessments had been made
on certificate would not charge pledgee with
constructive notice that certificate was spurious, when plaintiff had no actual knowledge of
these facts, and as pledgee had no duty or occasion to inquire in regard to them. Commercial
Bank v. Spanish Fork South Irrigation Co., 107
Utah 279, 153 P.2d 547 (1944).
Where bonds or warrants of state or political
subdivision are payable only from certain
money or funds in treasury, statute does not
run so long as fund remains unprovided; but
where obligation is payable unconditionally,
statute runs from maturity of obligation notwithstanding no funds may be available from
which to meet obligation, it being creditor's
duty to reduce claim to judgment prior to expi-
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ration of statutory limitation period. Parker v.
Weber County Irrigation Dist., 68 Utah 472,
251 P. 11 (1926).
The statute of limitations ,does not begin to
run against an action in replevin for return of
the security on a note until the debt is due and
demand is made for return of the security.
Ketchum v. Lyon, 27 Utah 2d 138, 493 P.2d
645 (1972).
Where subcontractor brought action against
a supplier and manufacturer within four years
after delivery, the more specific UCC threeyear limitation period applied, rather than the
six-year limitation period for a contract in
writing. Perry v. Pioneer Whsle. Supply Co.,
681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984).
Nature of cause of action that seller of piano
and bench on title-retaining note had against
third person who had possession as donee of
original purchaser was determinative
of
whether Subsection (2) of this section or
§ 78-12-26(2) was applicable in action by seller
for possession. Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden, 112
Utah 436, 188 P.2d 995 (1948).
Action for specific performance of real estate
contract in which a new deed was substituted
for the deed originally placed in escrow was
barred by statute of limitations since plaintiff
had more than eight years prior to the filing of
the complaint for reasonable inquiry that
would have revealed the mistake or fraud.
McConkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah
1974).

Surety bonds.
Indemnity or guaranty bond between manufacturer and its consignee, a retailer, was a
contract or obligation in writing so that action
to recover or bond for breach of contract was
governed by this section. Victor Sewing-Machine Co. v. Crockwell, 3 Utah 152, 1 P. 470
(1881), affd, 112 U.S. 676, 5 S. Ct. 327, 28 L.
Ed. 852, 112 U.S. 688, 5 S. Ct. 324, 28 L. Ed.
856 (1885).
Tolling.
The six-year statute of limitation applicable
to plaintiffs breach of contract action was not
tolled by defendant's settlement with other
claimants where the plaintiff was not a joint
obligee with the other claimants. Fredericksen
v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983).
Notwithstanding this section, where a wife
and husband execute a mortgage on husband's
real property to secure a debt of husband and

wife or the debt of the husband, payments
made upon debt by husband, or a written acknowledgment of debt by husband made prior
to bar of statute of limitations, suspends running of statute as to wife's inchoate right in
respect to foreclosure of mortgage. Tracy Loan
& Trust Co. v. Luke, 72 Utah 231, 269 P. 780
(1928).
Part payment of principle or interest by one
of two or more joint and several obligors does
not of itself toll statute against other co-obligors; where there was no evidence that decedent's widow knew of, consented to or had anything to do with part payments made by decedent, those payments did not suspend operation of statute as to her. Holloway v. Wetzel, 86
Utah 387, 45 P.2d 565, 98 A.L.R. 1006 (1935).
An action on note, commenced six years, one
month and 24 days after note fell due, was not
barred as to endorser, where evidence justified
finding that endorser had been out of state)in
excess of one month and 24 days. Upton v.
Heiselt Constr. Co., 116 Utah 83, 208 P.2d 945
(--1949).

-------

·-

Payments made by an assignee for benefit of
assignor's creditors does not of itself toll statute as to assignor; widow's making of assignment and listing of creditors to be paid did not
constitute a written acknowledgment of a particular note executed by her jointly and
severally
with her deceased husband.
Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 Utah 387, 45 P.2d 565,
98 A.L.R. 1006 (1935).
Mortgagor's payment of taxes on mortgaged
property in accordance with provision of mortgage did not constitute a "payment" on principal amount of mortgagor's obligation, within
meaning of§ 78-12-44, so as to toll statute of
limitations in regard to mortgage. Upton v.
Heiselt Constr. Co., 116 Utah 83, 208 P.2d 945
(1949).

Torts.
The word "liability" in this section does not
extend to a tort. Thomas v. Union Pac. R.R., 1
Utah 235 (1876).
Waiver.
Provision in a promissory note waiving the
right to plead statute of limitations as a defense is void as against public policy. Hirtler v.
Hirtler, 566 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1977).
Cited in Travelers Express Co. v. State, No.
19216 (Utah Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 15, 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 92 et seq.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 58 et seq.
A.L.R. - Time limitations as to claims

based on uninsured motorist clause, 28
A.L.R.3d 580.
Insurer's failure to pay amount of admitted
liability as precluding reliance on statute of
limitations, 41 A.L.R.3d 1111.
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Promises or attempts by seller to repair
goods as tolling statute of limitations for
breash of warranty, 68 A.L.R.3d 1277.

78-12-24.

Actions
years.

against

Key Numbers. 24, 25.

public

officers

Limitation of Actions ea>

-

Within six

An a.::tion by the state or any agency or public corporation thereof against
any public officer for malfeasance,· misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office or
against any surety upon his official bond may be brought within six years
after such officer ceases to hold his office, but not thereafter.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-24.
Cross-References. - Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq.

Misconduct by public servants, §§ 76-8-201,
76-8-202.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. -

§ 82 et seq.

53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions

78-12-25.

Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions ea>
58(2).

Within four years.

Within four years:
(1) an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares and
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store account; also on an
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received.
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-25.
Cross-References. -Antitrust
Act actions,
§ 76-10-925.

Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,

§ 78-15-3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assigned cause of action.
Breach of fiduciary duty.
Damage of private property for public use.
Divorce actions.
Excessive freight charges.
Extension of period.
Federal civil rights actions.
Indemnity or guaranty bond.
Judgment lien.
Land contract.
Malpractice.
Mortgages.
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Nuisances.
Open account.
Oral contract.
Oral modification of written contract.
Overpayment.
Purpose of section.
Personal injuries.
Pleading and proof.
Quieting title.
Recovery of payments under note.
Reformation of instrument.
Relief not otherwise provided for.
Restraining actions.
Running of statute.
Stockholder's duty to pay taxes.
Taking for public use.
Tolling.
Torts.
Trustees.
Water rights.
Written instrument.

Assigned cause of action.
The fact that a cause of action is made assignable by a statutory enactment does not
make the cause so assigned a liability created
by statute, so that where employee assigned
cause of action against third person to employer, limitation on such cause of action was
fixed by Subsection (2) and not by § 78-12-26.
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah
213, 17 P.2d 239 (1932).
Breach of fiduciary duty.
In action by corporation against its secretary
for wrongful surrender to a defaulting debtor of
ban~ stock allegedly pledged as security for
payment of promissory notes, where allegations of amended complaint charged deceit, but
charge as a whole indicated that action clearly
involved a breach of fiduciary duty, four-year
limitation on actions for relief not otherwise
provided for was applicable rather than predecessor to this section. Kamas Sec. Co. v. Taylor,
119 Utah 241, 226 P.2d 111 (1950).
Damage of private property for public use.
Right of abutting owner to recover damages
resulting from change of street grade is given
by Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 22, providing that
private property shall not be damaged for public use without compensation, and action to recover such damages was governed by predecessor to Subsection (1), and not by predecessor to
§ 78-12-26. Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah
221, 120 P. 503, 37 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1115 (1911).
Divorce actions.
Subsection (2) does not apply to divorce actions. Tufts v. Tufts, 8 Utah 142, 30 P. 309, 16
L.R.A. 482 (1892).
Excessive freight charges.
Suit by shipper to recover excessive freight

charges collected by railroad was governed by
Subsection (1) of this section, and not by
§§ 78-12-26 and 78-12-29. Jeremy Fuel &
Grain Co. v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 60 Utah 153,
207 P. 155 (1922).

Extension of period.
Where plaintiff performed legal services for
defendant from 1921 to 1951 and defendant acknowledged the existing liability in a letter in
1948, plaintiff was not precluded from recovering for the services rendered earlier since under § 78-12-44 the action could be brought
within the period prescribed after the acknowledgement. It was not necessary that there be
both an acknowledgment and a promise to pay.
Beck v. Dutchman Coalition Mines Co., 2 Utah
2d 104, 269 P.2d 867 (1954).
Allowance for room, board and pocket money
could not be construed as part payment in recognition of obligation to pay wages, and did not
extend period allowed for bringing action to
recover wages. Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah
545, 236 P.2d 451 (1951), distinguished, Taylor
v. E.M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d
279, 26 A.L.R.2d 947 (1953).
Federal civil rights actions.
All 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal civil rights actions brought in federal court in Utah are subject to the four-year limitations period provided in this section. Mismash v. Murray City,
730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1052, 105 S. Ct. 2111, 85 L. Ed. 2d 476
(1985) (See now § 78-12-28 (3)).
Indemnity or guaranty bond.
Subsection (1) did not apply to action upon
an indemnity or guaranty bond. Victor Sewing-Machine Co. v. Crockwell, 3 Utah 152, 1 P.
470 (1881), affd, 112 U.S. 676, 5 S. Ct. 327, 28
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856 (J.885).

Judgment lien.
Neither subdivision of this section barred action to impress judgment lien on property
where complaint alleged that property had
been transferred to defraud creditors and that
property was held in trust for defendant. Moulton v. Morgan, 115 Utah 119, 202 P.2d 723
(1949).
Land contract.
Where land contract contained no provision
for return of payments in case seller should
default, purchaser's action for payments was as
one for money had and received, and consequently this section, and not § 78-12-23, was
applicable. Brown v. Cleverly, 93 Utah 54, 70
P.2d 881 (1937), distinguished, Hardinge v.
Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 266 P.2d 494
(1954).
Malpractice.
In action to recover attorney's fees, defendants' counterclaim for malpractice and negligence of plaintiff-counsel was barred by the
four-year statute of limitations; any negligence
would have occurred more than four years
prior to the filing of the counterclaim and
should have been discovered prior to that time.
Hansen v. Petrof Trading Co., 527 P.2d 116
(Utah 1974).
Mortgages.
Fact that purchaser did not sign deed containing mortgage assumption clause and that
clause had been inserted pursuant to his prior
oral promise to pay mortgage note did not render liability one "not founded upon an instrument in writing"; therefore purchaser's liability on mortgage assumption was subject to sixyear limitation on written instruments under
§ 78-12-23 and not by four-year limitation under this section. Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co.,
95 Utah 490, 80 P.2d 471 (1938).
Nuisances.
In action for depreciation of property resulting from construction and operation of railroad
in street fronting property, any nuisance was
permanent and only one action could be maintained for damages resulting therefrom; such
an action was subject to four-year limitations
period. Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Cent. Ry., 68
Utah 309, 249 P. 1036 (1926).
Open account.
Subsection (1) applies to goods and wares
sold on open account. O'Donnell v. Parker, 48
Utah 578, 160 P. 1192 (1916).
The statute oflimitations in this section governing open accounts, not the statute governing contracts (§ 78-12-23), was applicable to a
claim by a warehouse owner and retail distributor against a tire company, alleging that the
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company had breached an agreement to ship
merchandise through the plaintiffs warehouse
whenever possible, since the parties had engaged in a series of transactions in which the
warehouse owner was debited for the tires it
purchased and credited for its commissions,
which constituted an "open account." Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pearson, 769 F.2d 1471
(10th Cir. 1985).
Where, in claim by attorney for legal services allegedly rendered a corporation, it appeared that "the items of the account drifted
along for ten years without demand for payment or a credit," and "the evidence tends to
show that each item, if not constituting a separate employment, was susceptible of that interpretation," there was no "open account" as contemplated by the statute. Bishop v. Parker, 103
Utah 145, 134 P.2d 180 (1943).
In action to recover wages for services rendered which was brought in 1950 on a contract
alleged to have been entered into in 1943,
wherein the plaintiff alleged both an express
contract and also sought to recover on a quantum meruit basis, such action was not an action upon an open account within the exception
of this section. Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 545,
236 P.2d 451 (1951), distinguished, Taylor v.
E.M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d 279,
26 A.L.R.2d 947 (1953).

Oral contract.
Mortgagee's right to recover deficiency judgment against grantee of mortgaged realty,
who, as part of consideration for conveyance,
orally agreed to pay mortgages, held barred by
statute, where action to foreclose was not
brought until after lapse of statutory period
following time when mortgage notes became
due. Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah 43, 48 P.
477 (1897).
Under Subsection (1), an action for specific
performance of alleged verbal contract to
transfer certain shares of mining stock, upon
which right of action accrued in 1884, was
barred if not commenced until 1892. Whitehill
v. Lowe, 10 Utah 419, 37 P. 589 (1894).
Action for specific performance of oral contract to convey land made a few days before
execution of deed to real estate which was allegedly part of same transaction brought over
five years after execution of deed, held barred.
Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah
475, 25 P.2d 952 (1933).
Oral modification of written contract.
Oral modification changing some of the
terms of written contract for construction of
signal pole line (viz. agreement to cover all of
contractor's losses and to pay depreciation and
capital expense) rendered the contract part
oral and part written so that four-year limitation on oral contracts governed contractor's action to recover under oral modifications.
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Strand v. Union Pac. R.R., 6 Utah 2d 279, 312
P.2d 561 (1957).

Overpayment.
Where an action is brought to recover an excessive amount paid-either
under a written
contract or other agreement-where
there is
no written promise to return said amount, that
action is founded on "implied contract" and the
statute of limitations with reference to obligations not founded on a written instrument is
applicable. Petty & Riddle, Inc. v. Lunt, 104
Utah 130, 138 P.2d 648 (1942), distinguished,
Hardinge v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 266
P.2d 494 (1954).
Purpose of section.
Subsection (1), which may be designated as
general statute of limitations, is statute of repose enacted as matter of public policy to fix
limit within which action must be brought or
obligation be presumed to have been paid, underlying purpose of which is to prevent unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning
which persons interested have been thrown off
their guard by want of prosecution. Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111 Utah 521, 184 P.2d
237 (1947).
Personal injuries.
Employee's action against third party for injuries received in course of employment was
governed by Subsection (2). Salt Lake City v.
Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 213, 17 P.2d 239
(1932).
Pleading and proof.
If plaintiff claims that bar of statute has
been tolled or is otherwise inapplicable, he
must sufficiently plead and prove the same.
Clawson v. Boston Acme .Mines Dev. Co., 72
Utah 137, 269 P. 147, 59 A.L.R. 1318 (1928).
Quieting title.
While actions by which nothing is sought except to remove a cloud from or to quiet title to
real property as against apparent or stale
claims are not barred by statute of limitations,
all actions in which principal purpose is to obtain some affirmative relief clearly come
within the provisions of Subsection (2).
Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153
P. 995 (1915).
Recovery of payments under note.
Six-year statute under § 78-12-23, and not
four-year statute under Subsection (1) of this
section was applicable to action by landowners
to recover from real estate brokers amount
owners were compelled to pay on note which
brokers promised in writing would be returned
to them. Kennedy v. Griffith, 98 Utah 183, 95
P.2d 752 (1938), construing R.S. 1933,
*§ 104-2-22 and 104-2-23.

Reformation of instrument.
Lessor's counterclaim for reformation of
lease with option to purchase was not barred
by statute of limitations where reservation of
oil and mineral rights had been omitted from
lease-option agreement by mutual mistake of
fact of the parties and plaintiff-lessees knew
that such rights had been leased to a third
party and made no claim to them until shortly
before initiating suit for specific performance
of option. Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180 (Utah
1975).
Relief not otherwise provided for.
Subsection (2) applies to all actions, legal or
equitable, where plaintiff seeks affirmative relief. Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296,
153 P. 995 (1915).
Statute relating to limitations of actions for
relief not otherwise provided for was intended
to deal with the time in which certain complaints in equity could be filed, and applied to
all suits in equity not strictly of concurrent
cognizance in law and equity. Fullerton v.
Bailey, 17 Utah 85, 53 P. 1020 (1898).
Restraining actions.
Where defendant secured order restraining
plaintiff from disposing of moneys collected on
execution after defendant's motion for new
trial was granted, and in subsequent trial judgment was rendered for plaintiff, defendant was
entitled to have moneys collected on execution
applied in satisfaction of such judgment under
former § 104-9-4, and contention that statute
of limitations barred such action was held
without merit. Cox v. Dixie Power Co., 81 Utah
94, 16 P.2d 916 (1932).
Subsection (2) applies to action to enjoin an
assessment levied on account of a municipal
improvement, because it is not a "suit to quiet
title," though assessment is a lien, as abutting
owner's title is not questioned. Branting v. Salt
Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 P. 995 (1915).
Running of statute.
Mere dissolution of partnership did not of itself give rise to a cause of action in partners so
as to start running of statute; absent proof to
establish claim was barred by statute of limitations, it was error to nonsuit plaintiff in his
action for accounting. Kimball v. McCornick,
70 Utah 189, 259 P. 313 (1927).
Statute began to run against action for indemnification for sums paid to satisfy judgment only from time judgment was paid.
Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129, 44 P. 833, 57
Am. St. R. 713 (1896).
Where written contract for sale of land did
not provide for return to purchaser, on vendor's
failure to convey, of part of purchase price
paid, purchaser's cause of action for recovery
thereof was on implied contract and accrued on
day after one on which vendor should have ten-

276

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
dered deed. Duncan v. Gisborn, 17 Utah 209,
53 P. 1044 (1898).
Where money is loaned on understanding
that repayment will be made at some unspecified, future time, the statute oflimitations does
not begin to run until a reasonable time has
elapsed; what is a reasonable time is a question of.fact. O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d
355, 463 P.2d 799 (1970).
In action to obtain subrogation to mortgagee's rights under mortgage, statute of limitations began to run when mortgage notes became due and not when, to prevent foreclosure,
plaintiff paid such notes. Fullerton v. Bailey,
17 Utah 85, 53 P. 1020 (1898).
The statute of limitations begins to run
against an open account on the day following
the last payment, and on an account stated on
the day following the agreement. Woolf v.
Gray, 48 Utah 239, 158 P. 788 (1916).
In action against administrator for services
rendered decedent commencing in 1908 and
continuing, with temporary intermission of a
few months between December, 1915, and
May, 1916, until death of decedent in 1922,
contention that action for services, except
those services rendered within four years immediately preceding death of decedent, was
barred by Subsection (1), was without merit,
since such services were deemed to be continuous, and the bar of the statute did not attach
until the full period of time had elapsed, the
statute having no application where there
were merely temporary interruptions in the
rendering of services. Gulbranson v. Thompson, 63 Utah 115, 222 P. 590 (1923).
Action against administratrix for collection
of claim against estate based on open account
was barred where action was not commenced
wfthin four years after last charge was entered
in account as required by this section or within
one year after issuance ofletters of administration as permitted by former § 104-2-38, even
though claim was presented to administratrix
within time specified in notice to creditors and
action was commenced within three months after notice of rejection of claim, and notwithstanding that claim was not barred during lifetime of debtor-decedent. Gray Realty Co. v.
Robinson, 111 Utah 521, 184 P.2d 237 (1947).
In action to recover for services rendered
where plaintiff established that services were
compensable monthly, the statute of limitations would start to run at the end of each
month, and plaintiff could not recover for
wages for services rendered four years prior to
time suit was instituted. Morris v. Russell, 120
Utah 545, 236 P.2d 451, 26 A.L.R.2d 947
(1951).
Claims of state and county against irrigation
district for services rendered during its organization are general obligations of district, and
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statute begins to run from time last of services
were rendered, notwithstanding no funds were
ever provided out of which such obligations
could be paid; Subsection (1) was applicable to
such action by state or county against irrigation district, in view of § 78-12-33. Parker v.
Weber County Irrigation Dist., 68 Utah 472,
251 P. 11 (1926).
In action by pledgee to recover loss sustained
by plaintiff when it accepted shares of defendant's stock as pledgee, which stock was void
because representing an overissue procured
through fraud, statute did not begin to run
until infirmity in certificate was discovered or,
by reasonable diligence, could have been discovered. Fact that no assessments had been
made on certificate would not charge pledgee
with constructive notice that certificate was
spurious, when plaintiff had no actual knowledge of these facts, and as pledgee had no duty
or occasion to inquire in regard to them. Commercial Bank v. Spanish Fork South Irrigation
Co., 107 Utah 279, 153 P.2d 547 (1944).
Statute of limitations runs against right to
recover illegal tax, paid under protest, from
date on which such tax was paid. Centennial
Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab County, 22 Utah
395, 62 P. 1024 (1900); Neilson v. San Pete
County, 40 Utah 560, 123 P. 334 (1912).
Statute of limitations began to run against
claim for use taxes allegedly due from foreign
corporation for years 1940 to 1943, inclusive,
from time that returns on forms supplied by
tax commission were actually filed by corporation, where commission had destroyed its own
records upon which it based its claim. Illinois
Powder Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 117
Utah 511, 217 P.2d 580 (1950).
Where trustee denies the obligation of his
trust, and cestui que trust has notice of his
repudiation, then statute of limitations begins
to run against a suit to enforce the same and
an accounting. Wood v. Fox, 8 Utah 380, 32 P.
48 (1893), aff'd sub nom., Whitney v. Fox, 166
U.S. 637, 17 S. Ct. 713, 41 L. Ed. 1145, 166
U.S. 648, 17 S. Ct. 1003, 41 L. Ed. 1149 (1897).
When a trustee denies the trust, or denies
liability under the trust relation, and the beneficiary has notice of such repudiation, then the
statute of limitations attaches, and under Subsection (2) an action to recover the interest of a
beneficiary in the proceeds of a sale made by
such trustee after four years had elapsed was
barred by limitations. Felkner v. Dooly, 28
Utah 236, 78 P. 365, 3 Ann. Cas. 199 (1904).

Stockholder's duty to pay taxes.
Duty of stockholder to pay company's taxes
was held to arise out of "implied contract" and
not an express contract; accordingly, it was
governed by this section. Petty & Riddle, Inc.
v. Lunt, 104 Utah 130, 138 P.2d 648 (1942),
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distinguished, Hardinge v. Eimco Corp., 1
Utah 2d 320, 266 P.2d 494 (1954).

Taking for public use.
Subsection (2) did not govern action for compensation for taking of land by railroad without landowner's consent 'and without condemnation proceedings; it was governed by
§ 78-12-6. Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short
Line R.R., 46 Utah 203, 148 P. 439 (1915),
affd, 246 U.S. 446, 38 S. Ct. 34.8, 62 L. Ed. 823
(1918).
Tolling.
Action by administrator
upon check is
barred by Subsection (1), and bar is not removed nor statute tolled by un,authorized application of payments by. plaintiff. Bingham v.
Walker Bros., Bankers, 75 Utah 149, 283 P.
1055 (1929).
In action to recover judgment for amount of
rejected claim against estate of defendant's intestate, defended on ground statute of limitations had run, held, testimony of plaintiff that
defendant's intestate promised to care for
graves- of plaintiffs children, and let value of
such services apply on his indebtedness to
plaintiff, was insufficient to toll statute where
35 years had elapsed since indebtedness sued
on in action was incurred. Hawkley v. Heaton,
54 Utah 314, 180 P. 440 (1919).
Commencement of an action in justices'
court saves the bar of the statute. Quealy v.
Sullivan, 42 Utah 565, 132 P. 4 (1913).
Pendency of equity action in city court,
which had no jurisdiction, held not to toll the
statute of limitations. American Theatre Co. v.
Glasmann, 95 Utah 303, 80 P.2d 922 (1938).
Trial court erred in failing to apply federal
tolling policy (that statute does not begin to
run until fraud is discovered) with result that
action against corporation for failure to meet
requirements of Investment Company Act of
1940, was not barred. Esplin v. Hirschi, 402
F.2d 94 (l:0th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
928, 89 S. Ct. 1194, 22 L. Ed. 2d· 459 (1969).
That one partner confessed judgment on an
account before the statute had run has no effect as against the other after four years except
to make the claim an account stated, so that in
an action begun after such time it is immaterial whether one partner could bind the other.
Woolfv. Gray, 48 Utah 239, 158 P. 788 (1916).
Part payment of principle or interest by one
of two or more joint and several obligors does
not of itself toll statute against other co-obligors; where there was no evidence that decedent's widow knew of, consented to or had anything to do with part payments made by decedent, those payments did not suspend operation of statute as to her. Holloway v. Wetzel, 86
Utah 387, 45 P.2d 565, 98 A.L.R. 1006 (1935).
Payments made by an assignee for benefit of
assignor's creditors did not of itself toll statute

as to assignor; widow's making of assignment
and listing of creditors to be paid did not constitute a written acknowledgment of a particular note executed by her jointly and severally
with her deceased husband. Holloway v.
Wetzel, 86 Utah 387, 45 P.2d 565, 98 A.L.R.
1006 (1935).

Torts.
Action for damages to plaintiffs land, due to
cement, dust and smoke emanating from defendant's cement plant, was not barred where
brought ten years after plant's commencement
of operation; it was not barred by three-year
statute of limitations (§ 78-12-26, Subsection
1), since it was not an action for trespass, and
it was not barred by Subsection (2) of this section, the nuisance constituting a recurring one,
rather than a continuing one. Thackery v.
Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231
P. 813 (1924).
Subsection (2) does not govern an action to
recover damages for pollution of a pond,
brought by plaintiff who does not own any interest in land on whlch pond is located; it is
§ 78-12-26(2).
Reese
v.
governed
by
Qualtrough, 48 Utah 23, 156 P. 955, 14 A.L.R.
94 (1916).
Action against railroad for damages to plaintiffs property by jar of passing trains was governed by Subsection (2), not by § 78-12-26.
O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 38 Utah
475, 114 P. 127 (1911).
The tort of reckless misconduct or reckless
disregard of safety is a for,m of negligence, not
an intentional tort, and is subject to the fouryear statute of limitations in this section.
Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2dJ 321 (Utah
1980).
The word "liability" in Subsection (1) did not
extend to a tor.t. Thomas v. Union Pac. R.R., 1
Utah 235 (1876).
Tort actions not otherwise provided for are,
embraced under provisions of Subsection (2).
Thomas v. Union Pac. R.R., 1 Utah 235 (1876).
Trustees.
The defenses oflimitations and laches are, as
a general rule, not available to a trustee
against a beneficiary while the latter is in possession of the property. Child v. Child, 8 Utah
2d 261, 332 P.2d. 981 (1958).
Water rights.
While prior appropriator's dam, canal, or
other works were in process of construction,
but he was not yet ready to actually use the
water for the purpose intended, its use by other
persons, causing no injury to the first appropriator, gave him no cause of action for relief, either equitable or legal. Accordingly, action for
declaratory judgment was not barred by his
failure to bring action within four years after
prior appropriator had recorded certificate is-
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sued by state
showing allowance of
change in point of diversion and return.
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154
P.2d 748 (1944).
Written instrument.
Farmer's obligation to pay for work performed in leveling a portion of his land was
founded upon a written instrument and thus
governed by six-year statute of limitations un-
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der § 78-12-23 rather than four-year period
under this section where, after preliminary negotiations and oral estimate, parties executed
a written instrument, stating the price to be
paid, in form of documents supplied by federal
agency which was paying portion of cost.
Evans v. Pickett Bros. Farms, 28 Utah 2d 125,
499 P.2d 273 (1972).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions §§ 100, 101.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§§ 67 to 72, 103.
A.L.R. - Application of statute of limitations to damage actions against public accountants for negligence in performance of professional services, 26 A.L.R.3d 1438.
When statute of limitations commences to
run against claim for contribution or indemnity based on tort, 57 A.L.R.3d 867.
What statute of limitations applies to action
for contribution against joint tortfeasor, 57
A.L.R.3d 927.
Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or bastardy proceedings, 59 A.L.R.3d 685.

78-12-25.5.

Promises or attempts by seller to repair
goods as tolling statute of limitations for
breach of warranty, 68 A.L.R.3d 1277.
Effect of injured employee's proceeding for
workmen's compensation benefits on running
of statute of limitations governing action for
personal injury arising from same incident, 71
A.L.R.3d 849.
Tort claim against which period of statute of
limitations has run as subject to setoff, counterclaim, cross bill, or cross action in tort action arising out of same accident or incident,
72 A.L.R.3d 1065.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions eao
26 to 28, 39.

Injury due to defective design or construction
of improvement to real property - Within seven
years.

No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or
for any injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out
of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor
any action for damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought
against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to real property more
than seven years after the completion of construction.
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, or any
other legal entity.
(2) Completion of construction for the purposes of this act shall mean
the date of issuance of a certificate of substantial completion by the
owner, architect, engineer or other agents, or the date of the owner's use
or possession of the improvement on real property.
The limitation imposed by this provision shall not apply to any person in
actual possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such improvement
constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring
an action.
This provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting the periods
otherwise prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action.
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History: C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, enacted by L.
1967, ch. 218, § 1.
Meaning of "this act". - The term "this
act," referred to in Subsection (2), means Laws
1

1967, Chapter 218, which appears as this section.
Cross-References. - Product Liability Act,
statute of limitations, § 78-15-3.
Wrongful death, §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.
Time statute commences to run.
-Completion of construction.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Seven-year limitation is applicable to the
owner or tenant in possession at time of construction, or to their successors; those in possession and control of realty have a continuing
duty to make repairs, and should discover any
fault in construction within seven years; claim
that the statute is unconstitutional is without
merit. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah
1974).

Time statute commences

to run.

-Completion
of construction.
This section provides the time when the statute oflimitations commences to run as being at
the completion of construction, and not discovery of negligence. Hooper Water Imp. Dist. v.
Reeve, 642 P.2d 745 (Utah 1982).
Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp. (D.
Utah 1986) 634 F. Supp. 100.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and
Construction Contracts § 114.
A.L.R. - What statute of limitations governs action by contractee for defective or improper performance of work by private building contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d 914.

78-12-26.

A.L.R. - Time of discovery as affecting running of statute of limitations in wrongful death
action, 49 A.L.R.4th 972.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions ec>
55(3).

Within three years.

Within three years:
(1) an action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property;
except that when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such
waste or trespass.
(2) an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term
"livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the defendant.
(3) an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that
the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
(4) an action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where
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in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this
state.
(5) an action to enforce liability imposed by § 78-17-3, except that the
cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably should know of the harm suffered.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; c. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-26; L. 1986, ch. 143, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment added Subsection (5) and made stylistic
changes throughout the remainder of the section.

Cross-References.
"Action" inclui:
special proceeding, § 78-12-46.
Livestock branding, Chapter 24 of Title .
Product Liability Act, statute of limitatio s,
§ 78-15-3.
I
Right of action for waste, § 78-38-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Accounting.
Damage to personal property.
Damage to real property.
Fraud.
Mistake.
Pleading and proof.
Statutory liability.
Subsection (3).
Taking personal property.
Taking of real property.
Trespass.
Use of property.

Accounting.
Action for accounting is not barred, and statute does not begin to run, so long as trust relationship continues to exist without friction.
Simper v. Brown, 74 Utah 178, 278 P. 529
(1929).
Damage to personal property.
There is nothing in the statute indicating a
legislative purpose to cut off rerr.~dies for tortious injuries to personal property, while making it inapplicable to remedies for injuries resulting from the breach of contract. Utah Poultry & Farmers' Coop. v. Utah Ice & Storage
Co., 187 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1951).
The three-year statute oflimitation provided
in this section is applicable to actions for negligently caused damage to personal property.
Holm v. B & M Serv., Inc., 661 P.2d 951 (Utah
1983).
Where plaintiff, who does not own any interest in real estate on which ponds are located,
brings an action for damages for polluting
same, such action is governed by Subsection (2)
of this section, as it is an action for damages for
mJury to personal
property.
Reese v.
Qualtrough, 48 Utah 23, 156 P. 955, 14 A.L.R.
94 (1916).
An action against a warehouseman for injury to the personal property stored sounds in

tort, and was barred under this section where
the warehouse receipt provided that the liability of the warehousemen under the storage
contract was limited to the "diligence and care
required by law," and thus did not create any
duty beyond the legal duty imposed by statute.
Utah Poultry & Farmers' Coop. v. Utah Ice &
Storage Co., 187 F.2d 652, (10th Cir. 1951).

Damage to real property.
Right of abutting owner to recover damages
resulting from change of street grade was
given by Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 22, providing
that private property shall not be damaged for
public use without compensation, and action to
recover such damages was not governed by predecessor to this section but by limitation on
actions for relief not otherwise provided for.
Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P.
503, 37 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1115 (1911).
Action against railroad for damages to plaintiff's property by jar of passing trains was not
governed by this section, which applied to common-law trespass, but not trespass on the case.
O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 38 Utah
475, 114 P. 127 (1911).
Action for damages to plaintiff's land, due to
cement, dust and smoke emanating from defendant's cement plant, was not barred where
brought ten years after plant's commencement
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of oper,ition; it was not barred by this section
since it was not an action for trespass, and it
was not barred by predecessor to § 78-12-25(2)
since the nuisance was a recurring one rather
than a continuing one. Thackery v. Union
Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231 P. 813
(1924); Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943).

Fraud.
This section applies to the fraud of a bank in
loaning the money of a depositor in a different
manner than he directs, for the benefit of the
bank, though the fraud is not intentional.
Larsen v. Utah Loan & Trust Co., 23 Utah 449,
65 P. 208 (1901).
Suit based on breach of warranty in contract
for sale of horse was governed by predecessor
to § 78-12-23 rather than predecessor to this
section. Clark v. Lund, 55 Utah 284, 184 P. 821
(1919).
The rule that statute of limitations is regarded as a statute of repose, and must be
given a fair and reasonable construction and
application, obtains in cases of fraud as well as
in other cases. Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244,
158 P. 426 (1916).
Action to recover corporate stock, sold for
nonpayment of assessment, on ground of fraud
and noncompliance with statute, held barred,
where plaintiff, who was one of directors of corporation, voted for assessment, received notice
of sale of delinquent stock, and acquiesced in
sale of his shares and slept on his rights for
more than three years. Raht v. Sevier Mining
& Milling Co., 18 Utah 290, 54 P. 889 (1898).
Grantor not in possession, who sought to
quiet title to land, which required cancellation
of deed on ground of fraud or mistake, held
barred by three-year statute of limitations provided by this section, as against contention
that it was controlled by the seven-year limitation period of statute relating to recovery of
realty. Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 95 Utah
347, 81 P.2d 374, 118 A.L.R. 195 (1938), explained, Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. ex rel.
Salt Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309,273 P.2d 168
(1954).
Action to set aside deeds on grounds of fraud
and forgery was not barred by three-year limitation where plaintiff did not know she had
been cheated out of her property for more than
three years prior to commencement of action.
De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133,369 P.2d 290,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S. Ct. 37, 9 L. Ed.
2d 61 (1962).
Under rule that party will not be relieved of
consequences of executing instrument without
reading it in absence of deceit or misrepresentations by other party, grantors were not entitled to cancellation of simple, one-page deed on
claim that three-year limitation period had not
run because they were unaware that certain

property was included in deed until nineteen
years after execution of deed. McKellar v.
McKellar, 23 Utah 2d 106, 458 P.2d 867
(1969).
Action for reformation of warranty deed,
which had been substituted for the warranty
deed originally placed in escrow, was barred,
since plaintiff had more than eight years prior
to the filing of the complaint to discover the
mistake or fraud. McConkie v. Hartman, 529
P.2d 801 (Utah 1974).
Where deed was held in escrow for seven
years while grantee paid off a real estate contract, action to reform deed after delivery was
not barred by this section since the conveyance
was not effective until delivery and statute of
limitations did not begin to run until that
time; grantor's counterclaim, also seeking reformation, was not barred even though filed after statute would otherwise have run since it
arose out of same transaction alleged in complaint, was in existence at time of its filing and
was not at that time barred by statute of limitations. Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d
902 (Utah 1976).
In action for unpaid legacies claimed under a
will, under plaintiffs' theory of wrongful distribution and constructive trust, the period
within which the action should have been commenced ran from the time the persons entitled
to the property knew, or by reasonable diligence and inquiry should have known, the relevant facts. Auerbach v. Samuels, 10 Utah 2d
152, 349 P.2d 1112 (1960).
Suit to set aside alleged fraudulent conveyance to corporation was not barred by statute
of limitations although filed over four years
after conveyance, where evidence was conflicting as to whether plaintiffs knew or should
have known of the transfer, and exact method
and time of notification were not alleged.
Smith Land Co. v. Johnson, 100 Utah 342, 107
P.2d 158 (1940).
Statute oflimitations on actions premised on
fraud or mistake was not a bar to an action to
impress judgment lien on property, where complaint alleged that property had been transferred to defraud creditors, and that property
was held in trust for defendant. Moulton v.
Morgan, 115 Utah 119, 202 P.2d 723 (1949).
In action to recover damages for fraud in
connection with sale of mining claims, evidence supported finding that vendors had not
discovered the alleged fraud more than three
years before instituting suit. Holland v.
Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 989 (1960).
Action filed October 17, 1960 to set aside
deed of interest in mining claims on ground of
grantee's fraud was barred where grantor was
sufficiently apprised of his cause of action prior
to October 17, 1957. Horn v. Daniel, 315 F.2d
471 (10th Cir. 1962).
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If a cause of action is barred against the
agent of an undisclosed principal, it is also
barred against such principal, unless there was
fraudu4,mt concealment of the principal; but
mere concealment of the agency, if such be
done, is not such fraud as will toll the statute.
Gibson V. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426
(1916).
Action against broker for fraud in inducement of contract to buy lot begun more than
three years after purchaser learned subdivider
did not have title to the lot and refused to
make further payments was barred by this section. Ross v. Olson, 25 Utah 2d 342, 481 P.2d
675 (1971).
In the case of fraud, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is
discovered by the injured person. Esponda v.
Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 117, 283 P. 729
(1929).
Where action to set aside conveyances, consideration for 'which were stated to be for one
dollar and other good and valuable consideration, was not brought until seven years after
conveyances were made and recorded, action
was barred by this section, since discovery was
made, or situation was such as to furnish full
opportunity for the discovery of fraud, if any
existed, more than three years before bringing
of the action, and this section began to run
from time reasonably prudent person would
have investigated the other valuable consideration and discovered the falsity, if any. Smith
v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932),
distinguished, Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d
1241 (Utah 1975).
The time of discovery of fraud is a question of
fact; the possession of all information necessary to discovery of fraud satisfies the requirements of Subsection (3) of this section. Horn v.
Daniel, 315 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1962).
-~ A city is as much bound by the limitation
herein provided for as are private corporations
and individuals, and it cannot claim ignorance
of fraud or mistake if its officers had knowledge thereof or the means of knowledge. Salt
Lake City v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 43 Utah 181,
134 P. 603 (1913), overruled, Nunnelly v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 107 Utah 381, 154
P.2d 620 (1944).
Time within which an action to obtain relief
against mistake or fraud must be commenced
is within time fixed by statute, and time begins
to run from time aggrieved party acquired, or
sought to have acquired, knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake. Weight v.
Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 P. 899 (1915).
One informed of such facts as will put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on
inquiry has received such information as will
start the running of limitations, for whatever
is notice to excite attention and put one on
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guard, and call for inquiry, is notice of what
inquiry will lead to. Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah
244, 158 P. 426 (1916).
There is no discovery of facts by the aggrieved party, where notice is merely given to
independent contractor, such as stray gatherer
of sheep, who acted for both parties to the suit.
Madsen v. Madsen, 72 Utah 96, 269 P. 132
(1928).
Utah statute of limitations pertaining to
fraud controlled filing of complaint under
§ l0(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
the rules promulgated pursuant thereto because neither federal statute nor rule under
which action was brought provided period of
time for bringing action. Chiodo v. General
Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860 (10th Cir.
1967).
In action for alleged violations of § l0(b) of
Securities and Exchange Act and Rule l0b-5
promulgated by securities and exchange commission and for common-law fraud, three-year
statute of limitations provided for by this section applied since there is no federal statute of
limitations applicable to such alleged violations. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309
F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), affd as modified
sub nom. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004, 92 S. Ct. 564, 30 L. Ed. 2d 558 (1971).
Application of this section in action based on
violation of § 10b of Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and Rule l0b-5 promulgated thereunder was proper since such actions are based on
"fraud or mistake." Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004, 92 S. Ct. 564, 30 L. Ed. 2d 558
(1971), 405 U.S. 918, 92 S. Ct. 943, 30 L. Ed. 2d
788 (1972). Statute began running when the
facts constituting the fraud were or should
have been discovered. Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971).
The three-year statute of limitation provided
in this section is applicable to actions under
§ 206 of the federal Investment Advisers Act.
Brown v. Producers Livestock Loan Co., 469 F.
Supp. 27 (D. Utah 1978).
The three-year statute oflimitation provided
in this section is applicable to actions under
the antifraud provision of the federal Securities Act, § 17(a). Brown v. Producers Livestock
Loan Co., 469 F. Supp. 27 (D. Utah 1978).
The three-year statute oflimitation provided
in this section is applicable to actions under
§ l0(b) of the federal Securities Exchange Act
and Rule l0(b)-5 promulgated thereunder.
Brown v. Producers Livestock Loan Co., 469 F.
Supp. 27 (D. Utah 1978). Hackford v. First Sec.
Bank, 521 F. Supp. 541 (D. Utah 1981).
Action to recover bonds which were exchanged for stock, on ground that Securities
Act of state in which exchange was made was
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not complied with, was action for fraud or mistake within this section. Gillespie v. Blood, 81
Utah 306, 17 P.2d 822. (1932).
Three-year statute of limitations applies to
claims of fraud brought under Utah blue sky
laws(§ 61-1122). Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351
(10th Cir. 197\4),cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007, 95
S. Ct. 2628, 45 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1975).
Additional stock given to plaintiff without
consideration after plaintiff had the reasonable
ability to discover-any fraud could not be construed as a modification of the stock purchase
contract so as to toll statutes of limitation.
Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974).
Action to have corporate officers declared
trustees and as holding in trust for use and
benefit of corporation certain mining claim,
held barred by this section, where action was
brought more than three years after discovery
of fraud, since even ifrelationship between corporation and officers was that of trustee and
cestui que trust, trust was not express trust as
to which only limitations do not run. Jones
Mining Co. v. Cardiff Mining & Milling Co., 56
Utah 449, 191 P. 426 (1920).
An action to impress trust upon real property was not barred by predecessor to Subsection (3) where there was no allegation of fraud
or mistake in complaint. Haws v. Jensen, 116
Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229 (1949).
In action by corporation against its secretary
for wrongful surrender to a defaulting debtor of
bank stock allegedly pledged as security for
payment of promissory notes, where allegations of amended complaint charged deceit, but
charge as a whole indicated that action clearly
involved a breach of fiduciary duty, applicable
statute of limitations was that on actions not
otherwise provided for rather than statute on
actions premised on fraud or mistake. Kamas
Sec. Co. v. Taylor, 119 Utah 241, 226 P.2d 111
(1951).

Mistake.
Lessor's counterclaim for reformation of
lease with option to purchase was not barred
by statute of limitations where reservation of
oil and mineral rights had been omitted from
lease-option agreement by mutual mistake of
fact of the parties and plaintiff-lessees knew
that such rights had been leased to a third
party and made no claim to them until shortly
before initiating suit for specific performance
of option. Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180 (Utah
1975).
Under Subsection (3) a mistake in a deed in
describing grantee's right in regard to use of a
passageway, delivered to grantee thirty years
before suit, was barred, since he will be presumed to have known of the mistake. Reese
Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684
(1916).

Pleading and proof.
If plaintiff claims that bar of this statute has
been tolled or is otherwise inapplicable, he
must sufficiently plead and prove the same.
Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Dev. Co., 72
Utah 137, 269 P. 147, 59 A.L.R. 1318 (1928).
This statute, being an affirmative defense,
must be expressly pleaded and proved. De Vas
v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S. Ct. 37, 9 L. Ed. 2d
61 (1962).
In one leading case in this state it was held
that "a general allegation" in the complaint
that plaintiff"did not discover the fraud until a
date within three years of the commencement
of the action should be sufficient to get him
past a demurrer" (now motion to dismiss); a
rule requiring plaintiff to set out in great detail his avoidance of said anticipated defense
did not seem to have practical merit. The court
had already remarked that the statute of limitations is a matter of defense, and that it is
rather unusual to require plaintiff to anticipate such a defense by allegations in his complaint. Nunnelly v. First Fed. Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 107 Utah 347, 154 P.2d 620 (1944);
Bennion v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 107
Utah 381, 154 P.2d 634 (1944).
While a cause of action for fraudulently taking, commingling, and concealing animals is
not stated under Subsection (2) by merely alleging that such acts were "fraudulently" done,
still where complaint alleges that defendant
took the animals (sheep) into his possession;
that he knew of plaintiff's ownership of them;
that he commingled them with his own; that
he took the wool and lambs from them and appropriated them, and that he earmarked and
branded them with his own earmark and
brand, which facts were concealed, a cause of
action is stated. Madsen v. Madsen, 72 Utah
96, 269 P. 132 (1928).
If defendant foreign corporation sets up that
action is barred by this section, plaintiff must
in his reply state facts and circumstances tolling statute; corporation need not prove it had
complied with §§ 16-8-1 and 16-8-3 (since repealed). Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Dev.
Co., 72 Utah 137, 269 P. 147, 59 A.L.R. 1318
(1928).
Substitution of parties related back to time
complaint was filed in action in which both the
complaint and the counterclaim sought reformation of a deed, since both the old and new
parties had a substantial identity of interest,
and the new parties were involved in the litigation, though unofficially, from an early
stage. Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902
(Utah 1976).
Statutory liability.
The fact that a cause of action is made assignable by a statutory enactment does not
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make the cause so assigned a liability created
by s\atute, so that where employee assigned
cause of action against third person to employer, limitation on such cause of action was
fixed by statute on actions for relief not otherwise provided for rather than statute on actions for liability created by statute. Salt Lake
City v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 213, 17
P.2d 239 (1932). For further history of this
case, see Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 101
Utah 219, 120 P.2d 281 (1941).
As gist of action against county treasurer
and his surety for money lost in closed bank
was liability imposed by statute, limitation on
such action was controlled by this section. Box
Elder County v. Harding, 83 Utah 386, 28 P.2d
601 (1934).
Cause of action to recover damages for injury
based upon claimed negligence of plaintiff's
employer, who did not carry compensation insurance and had not qualified as a self-insurer,
did not involve a liability created by statute
within this section. Peterson v. Sorensen, 91
Utah 507, 65 P.2d 12 (1937).
Statute of limitations did not begin to run
until judgment creditor attempted to enforce
his judgment and trust was asserted against
him as defense to collection, even though assets of trust were conveyed to trustee more
than three years before the action. Leach v.
Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1975).
Suit by shipper to recover excessive freight
charges collected by railroad was governed by
predecessor to§ 78-12-25(1) rather than predecessor to this section. Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co.
v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 60 Utah 153,207 P. 155
(1922).
A summary proceeding to seize and sell a car
does not constitute an "action" within meaning
of former provision setting forth limitation period for actions to enforce a liability created by
statute. Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Comm'n,
110 Utah 426, 174 P.2d 984 (1946).
This section was inapplicable to suit to foreclose tax lien. Jones v. Box Elder County, 52
F.2d 340 (10th Cir. 1931).
The right of abutting owner to recover damages for change of grade is not governed by this
section. Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah
221, 120 P. 503, 37 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1115 (1911).
Proceeding by tax commission for appointment of administrator to collect and pay inheritance taxes upon estate which had been held
in joint tenancy with right of survivorship,
held a statutory action within one-year limitation period. In re Swan's Estate, 95 Utah 408,
79 P.2d 999 (1938).
Claims of state and county against irrigation
district for salaries, clerical work, etc., are
barred by this section. Parker v. Weber County
Irrigation Dist., 68 Utah 472, 251 P. 11 (1926).
Written lien on real estate granted by aged
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couple to government agency in order to qualify for old-age assistance and to secure reimbursement of money paid by division was not
an "obligation created by statute" and hence
was not subject to three-year statute of limitation. Juab County Dep't of Pub. Welfare v.
Summers, 19 Utah 2d 49, 426 P.2d 1 (1967).
An action for damages against a railroad for
alleged negligent killing of cattle due to failure
to maintain cattle guards as required by former C.L. 1907, § 456x, was not an "action for
liability created by statute" within meaning of
this section, the action being grounded upon
negligence as well as upon the statute. Preece
v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 48 Utah 551, 161 P.
40 (1916).
Return on tax commission's form 71,
whereon taxpayer made entries only as to sales
tax and signed printed certification at bottom
of form, but did not place figures, words, or
marks of any kind in space reserved for use tax
entries, did not constitute "return" within
meaning of Use Tax Act (§ 59-16-1 et seq.) so
as to start statute of limitations running
against use tax. Whitmore Oxygen Co. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 114 Utah 1, 196 P.2d 976 (1948).
Statute of limitations began to run against
claim for use taxes allegedly due from foreign
corporation for years 1940 to 1943, inclusive,
from time that returns on forms supplied by
tax commission were actually filed by corporation, where commission had destroyed its own
records upon which it based its claim. Illinois
Powder Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 117
Utah 511, 217 P.2d 580 (1950).
Action to rescind transaction not complying
with Blue Sky Law was governed by predecessor to Subsection (4), as being liability created
by statute. Wilson v. Guaranteed Sec. Co., 73
Utah 157, 272 P. 946 (1928).
Procedure to collect special improvement
taxes as provided in city ordinance was held
not to be an "action" within meaning of former
provision setting forth limitation period for actions to enforce liability created by statute.
Petterson v. Ogden City, 111 Utah 125, 176
P.2d 599 (1947). But see § 78-12-46.
This section governs actions for family expense under§ 30-2-9. Walker Bros. Dry Goods
Co. v. Woodhall, 61 Utah 259, 212 P. 523
(1923).
Claim for injuries must be made by employee
within one year, and filing of a settlement receipt by insurer within such period, upon
which commission took no action, does not constitute a claim. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Utah 235, 241 P. 223 (1925).
Filing claim with state insurance fund is
equivalent to filing with industrial commission
for purpose of stopping the running of statute
of limitations. Utah Delaware Mining Co. v.
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Industri1;1l Comm'n, 76 Utah 187, 289 P. 94
(1930).
Findings of commission on issues of estoppel
and ;neQtal incompetency as excuse for not filingfompensation proceeding within one year,
on conflicting evidence against applicant, were
bintling on\Supreme Court. Lowe v. Industrial
Com~,
87 Utah 413, 49 P.2d 948 (1935).
The plea of limitation must be interposed at
the first opportunity; it comes too late if interposed for first time at the rehearing. Utah Delaware Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76
Utah 187, 289 P. 94 (1930).
In a compensation case, plea of statute of
limitations must be interposed at first opportunity when its applicability is apparent, though
upon application, leave may be given to interpose it later, if proper showing is made. The
plea comes too late if first interposed at close of
case and just before its final submission. Chief
Consol. Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 78
Utah 4.47, 4 P.2d 1083 (1931).
All injuries mentioned in the application and
relied upon will be saved from the bar of the
statute, even though application is crudely
drawn and deficient as to dates. Horton v. Industrial Comm'n, 88 Utah 306, 54 P.2d 249
(1936).
In compensation cases it has been assumed
that the applicant is in time ifhe files his petition with the industrial commission within a
year (now three years) after the last payment
of compensation in cases where liability has
been voluntarily recognized by the employer or
insurance carrier, and payment of compensation inade to the injured employee. Chief
Consol. Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 78
Utah 447, 4 P.2d 1083 (1931).
Proceeding for workmen's compensation was
barred where it was not filed within year (now
three years) from date of accident or injury.
Lowe v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Utah 413, 49
P.2d 948 (1935).
In workmen's compensation cases, this section begins to run, not from time of accident as
was held in numerous previous decisions, but
from time of employer's failure to pay compensation when disability can be ascertained and
duty to pay compensation arises; not until
there is an accident and injury and a resultant
disability or loss does the duty to pay arise.
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah
510, 74 P.2d 657 (1937).
Commission's ruling that limitation statute
began to run from date of accident to worker's
eye, held error where testimony did not reveal
when impairment of eye became noticeable,
and commission made no finding that injury
was due to accident. Williams v. Industrial
Comm'n, 95 Utah 376, 81 P.2d 649 (1938).
Although Utah Industrial Act fixed no limitation within which a proceeding for compen-

sation must be commenced, such a proceeding
had to be commenced within one year (now
three years), as being a liability created by
statute, regardless of whether the proceeding
was denominated an action or a special proceeding of a civil nature. Utah Consolidated
Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 279,
194 P. 657, 16 A.L.R. 458 (1920); Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 170,
278 P. 60 (1929).
This section applied to applications for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Inter-Urban Constr. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 58 Utah 310, 199 P. 157 (1921); Utah
Delaware Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76
Utah 187, 289 P. 94 (1930); Salt Lake City v.
Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657
(1937).
Workmen's Compensation Act applies where
employer carries insurance, and a proceeding
under the act involves a liability created by
state, and must be brought within one year
(now three years). Peterson v. Sorensen, 91
Utah 507, 65 P.2d 12 (1937).
Since this section is not part of Workmen's
Compensation Act, where no plea was made
before commission that this section was relied
upon, claim for compensation filed over year
(now three years) after occurrence of accident
was not barred. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 64 Utah 176, 228 P.
753 (1924).
Failure to make or file a claim for compensation within limitation period may for good
cause be excused. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Utah 235, 241 P. 223 (1925).
This section did not apply to application for
additional compensation under § 35-1-78,
where original application was presented
within the year (now three years). Utah Apex
Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 77 Utah 542,
298 P. 381 (1931).

Subsection (3).
The three-year statute of limitations provided in this section for actions on the ground
of fraud is applicable to actions under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Argosy 1981-B, Ltd. v. Bradley,
628 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Utah 1986).
Taking personal property.
Where there is a bailment of chattels and no
time is fixed for the return of the bailed articles, the statute oflimitations does not begin to
run against the bailor's action to recover the
property or for loss or conversion until demand
for the return of the property is made upon the
bailee. Wasden v. Coltharp, 631 P.2d 849
(Utah 1981).
Statute begins to run against an action of
claim and delivery from time of commission of
wrongful act, and not from time of knowledge
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of act by plaintiff. Dee v. Hyland, 3 Utah 308, 3
P. 388 (1883).
Action by residuary legatees against executor for conversion of automobile, commenced
within three years after entry of decree of distribution, was not barred by limitations where
evidence would not support a finding that executor at any time prior to entry of decree of distribution, either by his acts or declarations, repudiated his trust with respect to estate property. Jones v. Cook, 118 Utah 562, 223 P.2d
423 (1950).
In absence of fraud or mistake, a cause of
action is, by Subsection (2) of this section,
barred absolutely in three years except in cases
where the property is a domestic animal yet in
existence and the action is for its recovery. If,
however, it is sought to be charged that the
animals were fraudulently taken, commingled,
ifud concealed by defendant, the action falls
within Subsection (3), and is not tolled until
three years after discovery of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. Madsen v.
Madsen, 72 Utah 96, 269 P. 132 (1928).
• Action against sheriff and judgment creditor
to recover damages sustained by reason of alleged wrongful seizure and sale of property
claimed to be exempt from execution was
within predecessor to this section rather than
predecessor to § 78-12-28 which applied only
to officers and did not include judgment creditors. Snow v. West, 35 Utah 206, 99 P. 674, 136
Am. St. R. 1047 (1909).
·Counterclaim by former employee alleging
wrongful conversion of a discovery by him that
was thereafter patented by his former employer and assigned to the employer's successor
in interest, and claim that ownership of the
patent should be in the former employee, was
an action based on taking or detaining personal property, and was subject to the threeyear statute of limitation provided in this section. Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668
P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983).
The words "personal property" in Subsection
(2) mean the right or interest which a person
has in things personal. Reese v. Qualtrough, 48
Utah 23, 156 P. 955, 14 A.L.R. 94 (1916).
The statute of limitations did not begin to
run against borrower's right to recover possession of pledge property as long as pledgor was
accepting payments on the loans, extending
time for future payments, and promising to
keep property for pledgee. Conner v. Smith, 51
Utah 129, 169 P. 158 (1917).

78-12-26

Where defendant secured order restraining
plaintiff from disposing of moneys collected on
execution after defendant's motion for new
trial was granted and in subsequent trial judgment was rendered for plaintiff, defendant was
entitled to have moneys collected on execution
applied in satisfaction of such judgment, and
contention that statute of limitations barred
such action was held without merit. Cox v.
Dixie Power Co., 81 Utah 94, 16 P.2d 916
(1932).
Where property was sold on title-retaining
note under contract providing that purchaser
could not sell, mortgage or otherwise dispose of
property before title passed without written
consent of seller, but seller knew that purchase
was made for purpose of giving property to
third person as gift and consented to such
transfer of possession, third person's possession
as donee of original purchaser was not wrongful but her right thereto was subject to conditions of contract, and seller's cause of action for
detaining personal property under Subsection
(2) would not arise until third person refused to
surrender possession after request, notice or
demand therefor, and period of limitations
would not commence to run until such right of
action accrued. Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden, 112
Utah 436, 188 P.2d 995 (1948).

Taking of real property.
Subsection (1) of this section did not govern
action by landowner for compensation for taking his land without his consent and without
condemnation proceedings by railroad company. Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short Line
R.R., 46 Utah 203, 148 P. 439 (1915), affd, 246
U.S. 446, 38 S. Ct. 348, 62 L. Ed. 823 (1918).
Trespass.
Evidence held to show that plaintiff bringing
action for trespass for removal of ore from mine
did not have actual knowledge of trespass prior
to few months before bringing action, and
hence was not barred by this section. Bullion
Beck & Champion Mining Co. v. Eureka Hill
Mining Co., 36 Utah 329, 103 P. 881 (1909).
Use of property.
Where lessee was held liable for rent for use
of premises under option in lease contract, lessor was not allowed to recover rent for entire
period of use but only period not barred by this
section. Fredrickson Bldrs. Supply & Constr.
Co. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 22 Utah 2d 405,
454 P.2d 288 (1969).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and

Deceit§ 400 et seq.; 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions §§ 82, 85 to 87, 89 et seq.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§§ 76, 78, 83.
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A.L.R. - Statutes of limitation concerning
actions of trespass as applicable to actions for
injury to property not constituting a commonlaw trespass, 15 A.L.R.3d 637.

78-12-27.

Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions
32(1), 34(1), 96, 98 et seq.

Action against corporate stockholders
tors.

$C>

or direc-

Actions against directors or stockholders of a corporation to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a liability created, by law must be
brought within three years after the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the
facts upon which the penalty or forfeiture attached, or the liability accrued,
and in case of actions against stockholders of a bank pursuant to levy of
assessment to collect their statutory liability, such actions must be brought
within three years after the levy of the assessment.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-27.
Cross-References. - Corporations generally, TjtJe 16.

Liability of bank stockholders, Utah Const.,
Art. XII, Sec. 18.
Stock ownership by banks, § 7-3-21.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
-Corporate mismanagement.
--Federal
statute.
-Foreign law.
"Liability created by law."
-Stockholder or director.
Pleading and practice.
-Action against defendants in representative
-Burden of proof.
--Discovery
of wrong.
-Specificity.
Running of statute.
-Funds wrongfully withheld.
--Discovery.
Applicability
-Corporate

capacity.

of section.
mismanagement.

--Federal
statute.
This section, rather than§ 78-12-23 dealing
with actions on written contracts, was applicable to investors' class action based on failure of
incorporators and directors to comply with
Federal Investment Company Act; federal tolling policy was applicable to the action so that
statute did not begin to run until investors discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the alleged
fraudulent practices of defendants. Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928, 89 S. Ct. 1194, 22 L. Ed 2d
459 (1969).

-Foreign law.
Lessor's action in Utah against stockholder
in lessee California corporation to enforce
stockholder's liability under California statute
was controlled by this section and not by
§ 78-12-29. Daynes-Beebe Music Co. v. Chase,
23 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1927).
"Liability created by law."
-Stockholder
or director.
The "liability" referred to by this section is
one arising out of the fact of being a director or
stockholder, that is, a liability founded on or
imposed because of the relationship of being a
stockholder or director; statute had no application to suit by judgment creditor against principal stockholder who had acquired assets of
judgment debtor corporation, without consider-
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ation, while winding up its business. American
Theatre Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Utah 303, 80 P.2d
922 (1938).
Pleading and practice.
-Action against defendants in representative capacity.
This section is applicable only when the action is against the defendants in their representative capacities as directors or stockholders of a corporation. Grosjean v. Ross, 572
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977).
-Burden

of proof.

--Discovery
of wrong.
Defendant asserting this statute of limitation as a defense has the burden to prove that
the action was not commenced within three
years after the plaintiff discovered, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, the wroqg giving rise to the action. Stewart v. K & S Co., 591 P.2d 433 (Utah 1979).

-Specificity.
Section of statute of limitations applicable to
suit must be specifically pleaded; if section
pleaded is not applicable, it does not avail defendant that the action may be barred by another section not pleaded. American Theatre
Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Utah 303, 80 P.2d 922
(1938).
Running of statute.
-Funds

wrongfully withheld.

--Discovery.
In an action by a stockholder against the corporation for funds wrongfully withheld from
the stockholder, the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the stockholder discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should discover, that there is a wrong. Stewart
v. K & S Co., 591 P.2d 433 (Utah 1979).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. -

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1819; 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations
§ 2315.
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§ 87.

53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions

Key Numbers. 34(5).

Limitation of Actions

Within two years.

Within two years, an action:
(1) against a marshal, sheriff, constable, or other officer upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity, and in virtue of
his office, or by the omission of an official duty, including the nonpayment
of money collected upon an execution; but this section does not apply to an
action for an escape;
(2) for recovery damages for the death of one caused by the wrongful
act or neglect of another; or
(3) for injury to the personal rights of another as a civil rights suit
under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-28; L. 1971, ch. 212, § 1; 1976,
ch. 23, § 13; 1987, ch. 19, § 3.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment added Subsection (3) and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation.
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1987, ch. 19, § 6
provides that the amendment to this section
applies only to causes of action that arise after
April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive application.
Cross-References. - Coal miners, limitation on wrongful death actions against mine
owners, operators, etc., § 40-2-16.

Death of person entitled to sue, effect on
statute of limitations, §§ 78-12-37, 78-12-38.
Escape by prisoner, limitation on actions for,
§ 78-12-29.
Improvements to realty, limitation on actions for wrongful death due to defective design
or construction, § 78-12-25.5.
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
§ 78-15-3.
Right to recover damages for death generally, Utah Const., Art. XVI, Sec. 5; §§ 78-11-6,
78-11-7.
Survival of cause of action, §§ 78-11-12,
78-11-13.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
A~ALYSIS

Act or omission of official duty.
Applicability of section.
Malpractice.
Wrongful death.

Act or omission of official duty.
Action against sheriff and judgment creditor
to recover damages sustained by reason of alleged wrongful seizure and sale of property
claimed to be exempt from execution was
within predecessor to § 78-12-26 and not predecessor to this section, which applies only to
officers and does not include judgment creditors. Snow v. West, 35 Utah 206, 99 P. 674, 136
Am. St. R. 1047 (1909).
Commencement of limitations period was
not delayed as to sheriffs from whom damages
were sought for willful and wanton failure to
investigate burglary either on theory of insufficient time for commencement of investigation
(four months) or that statute did not start to
run until damage occurred. Obray v.
Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17,484 P.2d 160 (1971).
Applicability of section.
This section does not apply to actions under
Federal Employers' Liability Act. Peterson v.
Union Pac. R.R., 79 Utah 213, 8 P.2d 627
(1932).
Malpractice.
Although cause of action against physician
arose prior to the 1971 amendment which included malpractice in two-year statute of limitations (since deleted), the action was barred
where not filed within two years from effective
date of the amendment. Greenhalgh v. Payson
City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).
Wrongful death.
Action for wrongful death against a third
person instituted under § 35-1-62 was barred
where death occurred on the third day of June,
1938, and the action was not commenced until
the twenty-seventh
day of June, 1942.
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah
114, 152 P.2d 98 (1944).
In wrongful death action by Utah resident
against Colorado residents, in which Utah
court had quasi in rem jurisdiction, Utah court
applied Utah law on matter concerning the
statute of limitations. Rhoades v. Wright, 622
P.2d 343 (Utah 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
897, 102 S. Ct. 397, 79 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1981).
The statute of limitations on wrongful death
is not a limitation on liability but is a limitation on the remedy. Seely v. Cowley, 12 Utah
2d 252, 365 P.2d 63 (1961).
Where guardians did not discover the death

of their ward, and therefore had no knowledge
that a cause of action for wrongful death existed until after two years had expired from the
date of the death of the ward, and the guardians alleged due diligence in searching for the
missing ward, it was improper for trial court to
dismiss guardians' action for wrongful death
on the pleadings on the basis of the statute of
limitations. Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84
(Utah 1981).
Right of action for wrongful death accrues at
time of death, and hence this statute of limita•
tions begins to run from that time and not from
time of appointment of personal representative, since wrongful death statute gives right of
action to heir and to personal representative.
Platz v. International Smelting Co., 61 Utah
342, 213 P. 187 (1923).
Where only surviving heir or lien enemy was
mother of deceased, likewise alien enemy, statute of limitations for wrongful death was tolled
as against her by predecessor to § 78-12-39,
and hence also tolled as against personal representative of decease. Platz v. International
Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 P. 187 (1923),
explained, Seely v. Cowley, 12 Utah 2d 252,
365 P.2d 63 (1961).
Section 78-12-35 which provides that if, after
a cause of action accrues against a person he
departs from the state, the time of his absence
is not part of the time limited for commencement of the action, applies to a personal representative of an estate who absents himself
from the state; where the administratrix of an
estate of a deceased motorist absented herself
from the state after her appointment, her absence tolled the running of the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death. Seely v.
Cowley, 12 Utah 2d 252, 365 P.2d 63 (1961).
In a wrongful death action based on the decedent's exposure to suspected carcinogens, the
statute of limitations must be tolled until the
plaintiff knows or should know through means
of due diligence of facts supporting the likelihood that a particular suspected carcinogen
was the cause of the decedent's cancer, and has
identified the likely source of exposure to that
carcinogen. Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc.,
758 F.2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1985).
The limitation period prescribed by this section is tolled in a wrongful death action by
§ 78-12-36(1), so an action on behalf of minor
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Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980);
In re Estate of Garza, 725 P.2d 1328 (Utah
1986).

heirs of a decedent could be brought more than
two years after the death and at a time when
an action by the decedent's widow is barred.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 22 Am. Jur. 2d Death§ 35
et seq.; 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions
§ 103; 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and
Employees § 548 et seq.; 70 Am. Jur. 2d Sheriffs, Police and Constables § 164.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§§ 74, 84.
A.L.R. - Right to amend pending personal

78-12-29.

injury action by including action for wrongful
death after statute of limitations has run
against independent death action, 71 A.L.R.3d
933.
Time of discovery as affecting running of
statute of limitations in wrongful death action,
49 A.L.R.4th 972.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions <11=>
31, 34(3).

Within one year.

Within one year:
(1) an action for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state.
(2) an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action
is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except when
the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.
(3) an action upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal
action, for a forfeiture or penalty to the state.
(4) an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or
seduction.
(5) an action against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process.
(6) an action against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to
property caused by a mob or riot.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-29.
Cross-References. - Libel, Chapter 2 of
Title 45.

Riot, response and recovery, Chapter 5a of
Title 63.
Seduction, §§ 78-11-4, 78-11-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Dismissal of action.
-Institution
of second action.
Excessive freight charges.
"False arrest."
Foreign statute.
-Stockholder's liability.
Pleading.
-Amendment of answer.
--Conditions.
-Specificity.
Reckless misconduct.
-Negligence.
Running of statute.
-Delinquent
taxes.
--Filing
of return.
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-Fraud.
--Discovery.
Unpaid taxes.
-Extension of statutory time period.
cific subdivision of this section relied upon as
required by statute would not be considered on
appeal where question was raised for first
time, but since subdivision relied upon was
first one, no one could have been misled. Attorney Gen. v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d
1277, 114 A.L.R. 726 (1937).

Dismissal of action.
-Institution
of second action.
Where action for false imprisonment brought
within one year was dismissed because, after
action had been called and jury impanelled, it
was discovered for first time that copy of complaint which defendant's counsel had obtained
from clerk's office was not copy of original complaint filed, held dismissal of action was not
trial upon merits and second action having
been instituted within one year after order of
dismissal, action was not barred by statute in
view of § 78-12-40. Salisbury v. Poulson, 51
Utah 552, 172 P. 315 (1918).

Reckless misconduct.
-Negligence.
The tort of reckless misconduct or reckless
disregard of safety is a form of negligence, not
an intentional tort, and is subject to the fouryear statute of limitations in § 78-12-25.
Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah
1980).

Excessive freight charges.
Suit by shipper to recover excessive freight
charges collected by railroad was governed by
§ 78-12-25(1), and not this section. Jeremy
Fuel & Grain Co. v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 60
Utah 153, 207 P. 155 (1922).

Running of statute.
-Delinquent

"False arrest."
"False arrest" is an aspect of the tort of false
imprisonment, and the statute of limitations
applicable to the latter also applies to the former. Tolman v. K-Mart Enters. of Utah, Inc.,
560 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1977).
Foreign statute.
-Stockholder's
liability.
Lessor's action in Utah against stockholder
in lessee California corporation to enforce
stockholder's liability under California statute
was controlled by § 78-12-27, and not by this
section. Daynes-Beebe Music Co. v. Chase, 23
F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1927).
Pleading.
-Amendment

of answer.

--Conditions.
Trial court did not abuse discretion in permitting defendants to amend answer to set up
defense of limitations under former statute at
conclusion of plaintiffs evidence, where defendants, as condition of amendment, agreed to
pay costs from time of first answer to time of
offering amendment.
Attorney
Gen. v.
Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 114
A.L.R. 726 (1937).
-Specificity.
Contention that party failed to plead the spe-

taxes.

--Filing
of return.
Failure of taxpayer to file returns of sales
taxes collected for more than two years, though
statute required monthly return, suspended
operation of three-year (now one year) statute
of limitations, as statute did not begin to run
until return was filed, because tax commission
could not sue for delinquent taxes until such
time. State Tax Comm'n v. Spanish Fork, 99
Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575, 131 A.L.R. 816 (1940).
-Fraud.
--Discovery.
In actions for fraud, statute does not begin to
run until fraud is discovered or could have
been reasonably discovered, but even when action is not based on fraud, in equity where
cause of action is concealed from one in whom
it resides by the one against whom it lies, the
statute will not run. Attorney Gen. v. Pomeroy,
93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 114 A.L.R. 726
(1937).
Unpaid taxes.
-Extension
of statutory time period.
Where claim for unpaid taxes had not been
barred by one-year statute, amendment extending limitation period to three years applied thereto. State Tax Comm'n v. Spanish
Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575, 131 A.L.R.
816 (1940) (decided under prior law).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 36 Arn. Jur. 2d Forfeitures
and Penalties § 95 et seq.; 50 Arn. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 390 et seq.; 51 Arn. Jur. 2d
Limitation of Actions §§ 68, 102 to 106, 401;
70 Arn. Jur. 2d Sheriffs, Police and Constables
§ 164.

78-12-30.

C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§§ 74, 82 to 84.
A.L.R. - What constitutes "publication" of
libel in order to start running of period of limitations, 42 A.L.R.3d 807.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions €=>
31, 34(1) to (3), 35(1).

Actions on claims against county, city or town.

-

Actions on claims against a county, city or incorporated town, which have
been rejected by the board of county commissioners, city commissioners, city
council or board of trustees, as the case may be, must be commenced within
one year after the first rejection thereof by such board of county or city commissioners, city council or board of trustees.
History: L, 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-30.
Cross-References. - Counties, presentation of claims, §§ 17-15-10, 17-15-12.

Governmental Immunity Act, limitation on
claims, §§ 63-30-13, 63-30-15.
Municipal bond proceedings, limitations on
actions contesting, § 11-14-21.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Sufficiency

of claim.

-When raised.
City rejecting claim for injuries could not
upon subsequent action by claimant contest
sufficiency of claim, since former § 10-7-77 re-

quired that if claim was deemed insufficient or
defective in certain particulars, city had to
point out defect or insufficiency at time. Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 P. 443,
51 A.L.R. 364 (1926).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Arn. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 401.
C.J.S. - 20 C.J.S. Counties§ 325; 63 C.J.S.
Municipal Corporations § 931; 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 2201.

78-12-31.

Key Numbers. - Counties €=> 216; Limitation of Actions €=> 58(2); Municipal Corporations e=- 742(3), 813, 1025.

Within six months.

Within six months:
an action against an officer, or an officer de facto:
(1) to recover any goods, wares, merchandise or other property seized
by any such officer in his official capacity as tax collector, or to recover
the price or value of any goods, wares, merchandise or other personal
property so seized, or for damages for the seizure, detention, sale of, or
injury to, any goods, wares, merchandise or other personal property
seized, or for damages done to any person or property in making any such
seizure.
(2) for money paid to any such officer under protest, or seized by such
officer in his official capacity, as a collector of taxes, and which, it is
claimed, ought to be refunded.
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-31.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Taxation.
-Applicability.
--Taxe~
paid to state.
--Unconstitutional
statute.
--Void
tax.

Taxation.
-Applicability.

barred where not brought within six months.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Mattson, 64 Utah
214, 228 P. 755 (1924).

--Taxes
paid to state.
Action for taxes paid to the state is limited to
the six-month period available under this section. State v. District Court, 102 Utah 284, 115
P.2d 913 (1941).
--Unconstitutional
statute.
Action against secretary of state to recover
taxes paid under unconstitutional statute was

--Void
tax.
This provision was not intended to limit time
for commencement of action against city for
money had and received by it in payment of
void sprinkling tax paid under protest. Raleigh
v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 130, 53 P. 974
(1898) (decided under prior law).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. -

§ 84.

Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions e=>
34(3).

53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions

78-12-31.1.

Habeas corpus -

Within three months:
For relief pursuant
apply not only as to
which in the exercise
petitioner or counsel

to a writ of habeas corpus. This limitation shall
grounds known to petitioner but also to grounds
of reasonable diligence should have been known by
for petitioner.

History: C. 1953, 78-12-31.1, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 133, § 1.

78-12-31.2.

Three months.

Post-conviction

Cross-References. 65B, U.R.C.P.

remedies -

Habeas corpus, Rule

30 days.

Within 30 days:
No post-conviction remedies may be applied for or entertained by any
court within 30 days prior to the date set for execution of a capital sentence, unless the grounds therefor are based on facts or circumstances
which developed or first became known within that period.
History: C. 1953, 78-12-31.2, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 133, § 2.

Cross-References.

§§ 76-3-206, 76-3-207.
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Capital sentencing,

Post-conviction hearings, Rule 65B, U.R.C.P.

78-12-32.
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Action on mutual account crued.

When deemed ac-

In an action brought to recover a balance due upon a mutual, open and
current account, where there have been reciprocal demands between the parties, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued from the time of the
last item proved in the account on either side.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-32.

Cross-References. - Complaint on an account, Form 4, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Scope and operation of section.
Under predecessor to this section where it
appeared from the allegations of the parties
that there was an open, mutual and current
account between the parties down to the com-

mencement of the action, no part of the account
was barred. Toponce v. Corinne Mill, Canal &
Stock Co., 6 Utah 439, 24 P. 534 (1890), aff'd,
152 U.S. 405, 14 S. Ct. 632, 38 L. Ed. 493
(1894).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur.
Accounting
C.J.S. § 165.
A.L.R. -

2d. - 1 Am. Jur. 2d Accounts and
§§ 14 to 16.
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions

poses of rule that limitations run from last
item in open, current, and mutual account, 45
A.L.R.3d 446.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions
54.

=

When is account "mutual" for pur-

78-12-33.

Actions by state.

The limitations prescribed in this article shall apply to actions brought in
the name of or for the benefit of the state in the same manner as to actions by
private parties.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-33.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Action."
-Appointment
of administrator.
-Summary proceeding to seize property.
Applicability of section.
-Actions by county.
Loss of property by adverse possession.
-School lands.

"Action."
-Appointment
of administrator.
Proceeding by tax commission for appointment of administrator to collect and pay inheritance taxes upon estate which had been held
in joint tenancy with right of survivorship,

held a statutory "action." In re Swan's Estate,
95 Utah 408, 79 P.2d 999 (1938).

-Summary proceeding to seize property.
A summary proceeding to seize and sell a car
did not constitute an "action" within the meaning of former provision setting forth limitation
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on action for liability created by statute. Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Comm'n, 110 Utah
426, ~4 P.2d 984 (1946). But see § 78-12-46.

Applicability

of section.

-Actions by county.
This section is applicable to actions brought
on behalf of county, as well as actions by the
state. Parker v. Weber County Irrigation Dist.,
68 Utah 472, 251 P. 11 (1926).

Loss of property by adverse possession.
-School lands.
Board of education may, by adverse possession, lose title to property not used for school
purposes, but held for sale as business property. Pioneer Inv. & Trust Co. v. Board of
Educ., 35 Utah 1, 99 P. 150, 136 Am. St. R.
1016 (1909).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Key Numbers. 11; States ea, 201.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions §§ 399, 416.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 15; 81A C.J.S. States § 222.

78-12-34.

Limitation of Actions e=>

Repealed.

Repeals. - Section 78-12-34 (L. 1951, ch.
58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-12-34), providing
that there is no limitation in actions to recover

bank deposits of money or property, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 16, § 1.

ARTICLE 3
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
78-12-35.

Effect of absence from state.

Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state,
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after
his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the
state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-35; 1987, ch. 19, § 4.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "Where" for "If when," substituted "as limited by this chapter" for "herein
limited" and made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.

Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1987, ch. 19, § 6
provides that the amendment to this section
applies only to causes of action that arise after
April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive application.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Absence" from state.
-Nonresident
motorists.
Applicability of section.
-Nonresidents.
-Personal representative
Burden of proof.
Computation of time.
-Periods of absence.
Construction of section.

of estate.

296

78-12-35

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
-Stri~t.
Foreign corporation.
-Pleadings and evidence.
Laches.
-Accounting.
Purpose of section.
Residence within state.
-Continual.
--Proof
of presence.
-Defendant's family.
-Statute tolled.
"Absence" from state.
-Nonresident
motorists.
Nonresident motorists were not "absent"
from the state so as to toll running of statute of
limitations, although they left state immediately after automobile collision and remained
without state, as they had an agent in person
of secretary of state upon whom process could
have been servM. Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d
254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964).
Applicability

of section.

-Nonresidents.
The words "return" and "departs" in this section comprehend all persons who are without
the state, and are not confined to the inhabitants thereof. Burnes v. Crane, 1 Utah 179
(1876).
Word "return" as used in this section includes nonresidents as well as citizens of state
who have gone abroad and returned to state;
the words "return to the state" are held to be
equivalent to "come into the state." Lawson v.
Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P. 520 (1908).
-Personal
representative of estate.
This section applies to a personal representative of an estate who absents himself from the
state; where the administratrix of an estate of
a deceased motorist absented herself from the
state after her appointment, her absence tolled
the running of the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death provided under
§ 78-12-28. Seely v. Cowley, 12 Utah 2d 252,
365 P.2d 63 (1961).
Burden of proof.
Plaintiff seeking to toll statute has burden of
proof; mere proof of nonresidence is not a
prima facie showing of absence from state.
Tracey v. Blood, 78 Utah 385, 3 P.2d 263
(1931).
Computation of time.
-Periods
of absence.
Statute runs only during time debtor is
openly in state, and immediately on his leaving it the statute again ceases to run until his
return; in computing time all periods of absence must be considered and added together.

Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169
P. 954 (1917).
Construction

of section.

-Strict.
Although generally statutes oflimitation are
to be liberally construed, it is also a well-recognized doctrine that when such statutes contain
provisions excepting certain persons or classes
from operation of statutes, those exceptions are
to be strictly construed. Lawson v. Tripp, 34
Utah 28, 95 P. 520 (1908).
Foreign corporation.
-Pleadings
and evidence.
Where answer of defendant foreign corporation set up statute oflimitations as defense and
face of pleadings and uncontradicted evidence
indicated statute had run, it was incumbent on
plaintiff to state in his reply conditions tolling
the statute; in Utah, foreign corporation's privilege of pleading statute of limitations was not
conditioned on its compliance with "doing business within the state" statutes. Clawson v.
Boston Acme Mines Dev. Co., 72 Utah 137,269
P. 147, 59 A.L.R. 1318 (1928).
Laches.
-Accounting.
Absence of defendant from state does not
preclude interposition of defense of !aches to
suit for an accounting, even though statute of
limitations has not barred proceeding. Smith v.
Smith, 77 Utah 60, 291 P. 298 (1930).
Purpose of section.
The objective of this section was to prevent a
defendant from depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity of suing him by absenting himself
from the state during the period of limitation.
Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915
(1964).
Residence

within state.

-Continual.
--Proof
of presence.
A finding that defendant had his home, family and residence in state continuously from
time debt was contracted is sufficient finding of
continuous presence in the state. Woolf v.
Gray, 48 Utah 239, 158 P. 788 (1916).
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I -Defendant's

or place of abode. Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder,
51 Utah 227, 169 P. 954 (1917).

family.
The full time that the debtor is out of the
state must be excluded in computing the time,
notwithstanding fact that debtor's family may
have residence or place of abode in state and
that service of process could be made upon
some member of debtor's family at its residence

-Statute tolled.
Maintenance of residence within state with
persons living therein did not prevent tolling of
statute of limitations. Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 Utah 391, 231 P. 123 (1924).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. - Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937, 945.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 154 et seq.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 211.

78-12-36.

A.L.R. - Tolling of statute of limitations
during absence from state as affected by fact
that party claiming benefit of limitations remained subject to service during absence or
nonresidence, 55 A.L.R.3d 1158.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions ea>
84, 85.

Effect of disability.

If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of
majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-36; L. 1975, ch. 67, § 16; 1987,
ch. 19, § 5.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment deleted the subsection references in this
section as set out in the bound volume, and
deleted "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in
execution under the sentence of a criminal
court, for a term less than for life" following
"without a legal guardian" and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section.
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1987, ch. 19, § 6
provides that the amendment to this section
applies only to causes of action that arise after

April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive application.
Cross-References. - Actions to recover
real property, effect of disability, § 78-12-21.
Age of majority, § 15-2-1.
Disaffirmance
of contract
by minor,
§§ 15-2-2, 15-2-3.
Guardians
of
incapacitated
persons,
§ 75-5-301 et seq.
Medical malpractice actions, limitations provisions applicable regardless of disability,
§ 78-14-4.
Product Liability Act, limitations provisions
applicable regardless of disability, § 78-15-3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Notice of
-Failure
--Action
--Action
Paternity
-Minority.
Wrongful
-Minority.
Cited.

claim requirements.
to file.
barred.
not barred.
action.
death.
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notice requirements by a minor does not bar
his claim. Scott v. School Bd. of Granite School
Dist., 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977).

Notice of claim requirements.
-Failure

78-12-37

to file.

--Action
barred.
This section had no application to action
against town which was barred because of failure to file claim. Hurley v. Town of Bingham,
63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924).
This section does not operate to extend statutory time for filing claims against a city until
after a minor claimant has obtained majority.
Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492
P.2d 1335 (1972).
Specific requirement of timely notice to city
of claim against it takes precedence over provision tolling statute of limitations during minority of a child; failure to comply with statutory notice provisions barred action against
city hospital by parents on behalf of newborn
infant. Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d
799 (Utah 1975).
--Action
not barred.
Notice of claim requirements in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-13, are
tolled by this section during the period of minority; therefore, failure to comply with such

Paternity action.
-Minority.
Any statute limiting the time within which a
paternity action must be commenced under the
Uniform Act on Paternity, § 78-45a-l et seq.,
is tolled for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs
during the period of the child's minority.
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah
1981).
Wrongful death.
-Minority.
The limitation
period prescribed
by
§ 78-12-28 is tolled by Subsection (1) of this
section as to a wrongful death action, so an
action on behalf of minor heirs of a decedent
can be brought more than two years after the
death and at a time when an action by the
decedent's widow is barred. Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980); In re Estate of
Garza, 725 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1986).
Cited in Hargett v. Limberg, 801 F.2d 368
(10th Cir. 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 182 et seq.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 216 et seq.

78-12-37.

A.L.R. - Tolling of statute of limitations, on
account of minority of injured child, as applicable to parent's or guardian's right of action
arising out of same injury, 49 A.L.R.4th 216.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions e=70, 72, 74 to 76.

Effect of death.

If a person entitled to bring an action dies before the expiration of the time
limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives, an
action may be commenced by his representatives after the expiration of that
time and within one year from his death. If a person against whom an action
may be brought dies before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced against the representatives after the expiration of that time and
within one year after the issue of letters testamentary or of administration.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-37.
Cross-References. - Decedent's cause of
action, statute of limitation on, § 75-3-108.

Decedent's creditors, statute of limitation on
claims by, § 75-3-802.
Survival of cause of action, §§ 78-11-12,
78-11-13.
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ANALYSIS

Action by personal representative.
/ -Existence of right of action.
Claims and actions against estate or personal representative.
-Common law.
-Effect of Probate Code.
--Open
account.

Action by personal representative.

period was not lengthened by former Probate
Code provisions requiring some claims to be
presented within certain time and action
thereon to be commenced within three months
after rejection although time allowed for commencing action might be shortened by such
provisions. Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111
Utah 521, 184 P.2d 237 (1947).

-Existence
of right of action.
Where right of action existed in decedent at
time of his death, it should have been brought
within year from his death by administrator.
Rasmussen v. Sevier Valley Canal Co., 40
Utah 371, 121 P. 741 (1912).
Claims and actions against estate or personal representative.
-Common law.
At common law, neither death of debtor nor
pendency of probate proceedings prevented
statute of limitations from running. Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111 Utah 521, 184 P.2d
237 (1947).
-Effect of Probate Code.
Action against estate of decedent not barred
at latter's death was to be commenced within
period of general statute of limitations pertaining to particular cause of action or within one
year after issuance of letters testamentary or
of administration, whichever was greater; such

--Open
account.
Action against administratrix for collection
of claim against estate based on open account
was barred where action was not commenced
within four years after last charge was entered
in account as required by former § 104-2-23 or
within one year after issuance of letters of administration as permitted by this section, even
though claim was presented to administratrix
within time specified in notice to creditors and
action was commenced within three months after notice of rejection of claim, and notwithstanding that claim was not barred during lifetime of debtor-decedent. Gray Realty Co. v.
Robinson, 111 Utah 521, 184 P.2d 237 (1947).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Key Numbers. 80, 83.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 194 et seq.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 243 et seq.

Limitation of Actions

€=>

78-12-38. Effect of death of defendant outside this state.
If a person against whom a cause of action exists dies without the state, the
time which elapses between his death and the expiration of one year after the
issuing, within this state, of letters testamentary or letters of administration
is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of an action therefor
against his executor or administrator.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-38.
Cross-References. - Decedent's creditors,
statute of limitation on claims by, § 75-3-802.

Survival
78-11-13.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 196.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 246.

78-12-39.

Key Numbers. 82.

Limitation of Actions €=>

Effect of war.

When a person is an alien subject or a citizen of a country at war with the
United States, the time of the continuance of the war is not a part of the
period limited for the commencement of the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-39.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Wrongful deatli.
Statute of limitations against action for
wrongful death of alien enemy by personal representative of deceased was tolled by this sec-

tion where only surviving heir of deceased was
mother, likewise alien enemy. Platz v. International Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 P. 187
(1923).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 175.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 259.

78-12-40.

Key Numbers. 113.

Limitation of Actions€=>

Effect of failure of action not on merits.

If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he
dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a
new action within one year after the reversal or failure.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-40.

Cross-References. - Survival of cause of
action, §§ 78-11-12, 78-11-13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amendment of pleadings.
-Nonsuit.
Application of section.
-Writs to enforce judgments.
Commencement of one-year extension.
-Affirmance of lower-court decision.
Conflict of Jaws.
-Action dismissed in other state.
Contestability of insurance policy.
-Initiation
of contest.
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Joint tort-feasors.
-Dismissal.
"Merits" of action.
-Dismissal.
-Nonsuit.
Nonpayment of costs.
-Presumption
that second suit vexatious.
Operation and effect of section.
-Advantages.
Pleading and proof of tolling.
-Judicial notice.
Res judicata.
-Dismissal.
Who may invoke section.
-Party affirmatively seeking relief.
Wrongful death action.
-Action brought by wrong party.

Amendment of pleadings.

Contestability of insurance policy.

-Nonsuit.
If statute of limitations has been tolled by
nonsuiting plaintiff, it is not prejudicial error
to refuse to allow an amendment to the pleadings since plaintiff can file a new complaint.
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44,
132 P.2d 680 (1943) (decided under prior law).

-Initiation of contest.
Insurer's filing of answer and counterclaim
in federal court, to which insured's action on
policies had been removed, did not constitute
the initiation of a contest within meaning of
policies' incontestability clauses; therefore this
section did not operate to render timely insurer's subsequent answer and counterclaim in
state court after action was remanded for want
offederal jurisdiction. Tracey Loan & Trust Co.
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah 33, 7 P.2d 279,
284 (1932).

Application of section.
-Writs to enforce judgments.
This section deals exclusively with the commencement of a new action after the first action has failed or the judgment thereon has
been reversed; it does not apply to writs to enforce judgments. Billings v. Brown, 639 P.2d
189 (Utah 1981).

Joint tort-feasors.

Conflict of laws.

-Dismissal.
Where defendants were sued as joint tortfeasors, and suit against one of defendants was
subsequently dismissed, held on appeal by
other joint tort-feasor from adverse judgment
that it was not necessary to serve notice of appeal on codefendant, since latter no longer had
any interest in appeal and was in no sense adverse party, notwithstanding provision in this
section that party failing in action, such as
plaintiff, might commence new action within
one year after reversal or failure. Badertscher
v. Independent Ice Co., 55 Utah 100, 184 P. 181
(1919).

-Action dismissed in other state.
In wrongful death action by Utah resident
against Colorado residents, in which Utah
court had quasi in rem jurisdiction, Utah court
applied this section to extend the time to bring
suit beyond the time allowed by Colorado law,
and fact that Colorado court had dismissed action based upon the same facts due to the running of its statute of limitations did not require
Utah court to give full faith and credit to such
dismissal, and did not bar the action in the
Utah court. Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343
(Utah 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.
Ct. 397, 70 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1981).

-Dismissal.
Dismissal of action is not determinative of
case upon merits. Gutheil v. Gilmer, 27 Utah
496, 76 P. 628 (1930); Williams v. Nelson, 45
Utah 255, 145 P. 39 (1914); Platz v. International Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 P. 187
(1923).
Where action for false imprisonment,
brought within one year as provided in former
§ 104-2-26, was dismissed because after action
had been called and jury impanelled it was discovered for first time that copy of complaint
which defendant's counsel had obtained from

Commencement of one-year extension.
-Affirmance of lower-court decision.
Where judgment of nonsuit was rendered,
and on appeal affirmed after the expiration of
the limitation period, plaintiff had one year after such affirmance within which to commence
a new action. Gutheil v. Gilmer, 27 Utah 496,
76 P. 628 (1904) (decided under prior law).

"Merits" of action.
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clerk's office was not copy of original complaint
filed, held dismissal of action was not trial
upon merits, and second action having been
instituted within one year after order of dismissal, action was not barred by predecessor
statute. Salisbury v. Poulson, 51 Utah 552, 172
P. 315 (1918).
Voluntary dismissal of action by plaintiff
without prejudice held failure of action otherwise than upon merits. Luke v. Bennion, 36
Utah 61, 106 P. 712 (1909); Jones v. Jenkins,
22 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1927).
A judgment is not on the "merits" within
meaning of this section where a case in justice's court, argued and submitted on the
pleadings, was dismissed on plaintiffs motion,
without any ruling on motion for judgment on
the pleadings; therefore action brought within
one year after dismissal is not barred by limitations. Quealy v. Sullivan, 42 Utah 565, 132
•
P. 4 (1913).

-Nonsuit.
Where a nonsuit is granted, the action fails
"otherwise than upon the merits," and the reason for which nonsuit was granted is immaterial. A new action may be commenced within
one year after granting the nonsuit, if causes of
action in both complaints are the same. Williams v. Nelson, 45 Utah 255, 145 P. 39 (1914)
(decided under prior law).
Decree that "plaintiffs take nothing by their
complaint, that the same be and hereby is dismissed," rendered pursuant to conclusions of
law finding defendants "entitled to an order of
nonsuit," was a judgment of nonsuit, and not a
decision of the case on its merits. Braby v.
Rieban, 54 Utah 87, 179 P. 383 (1919) (decided
under prior law).
Nonpayment of costs.
-Presumption
that second suit vexatious.
Nonpayment by plaintiff of judgment for
costs in first action, which was dismissed without prejudice, did not, under statute, raise presumption that second suit begun by plaintiff
was vexatious, and trial court erred in suspending further proceedings until payment of
costs taxed against plaintiff in first action. Peterson v. Evans, 55 Utah 505, 188 P. 152
(1920).
Operation and effect of section.
-Advantages.
Because of this section, a defendant moving

78-12-40

to dismiss on other than the merits, although
his motion be sustained, can gain no permanent advantage, since plaintiff has the right at
any time within a year to bring another action.
Wright v. Howe, 46 Utah 588, 150 P. 956,
1916B L.R.A. 1104 (1915).

Pleading and proof of tolling.
-Judicial notice.
Where there was nothing on face of complaint in wrongful death action to indicate that
there had been a former action which had
failed otherwise than on its merits so as to
bring this section into play, Supreme Court
could not invoke section by judicially noticing
proceedings and records of a previously determined case. Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98 (1944).
Res judicata.
-Dismissal.
Judgment dismissing plaintiffs suit for foreclosure of certain mortgages on ground it had
been prematurely brought, the court making
no finding as to the amount due on the mortgages and notes secured thereby, not being on
the merits, is not res judicata at common law
or under predecessor statute. Stephens v.
Doxey, 58 Utah 196, 198 P. 261 (1921).
Who may invoke section.
-Party affirmatively seeking relief.
This section may be invoked by anyone affirmatively seeking relief; "plaintiff' includes not
only the party bringing the action but also any
party affirmatively seeking relief; defendants,
in quiet title suit, who sought to have title
quieted in them could invoke statute. Thomas
v. Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507
(1956).
Wrongful death action.
-Action brought by wrong party.
Where original wrongful death action was
dismissed after it was discovered that plaintiff
was not the natural son of the deceased, and
the parents of the deceased subsequently filed
a wrongful death action after the two-year
statute of limitation had run, the fact that
their suit was based upon their status as the
decedent's statutory heirs did not qualify them
for a limitation period extension since there
was no actual legal relationship between them
and the plaintiff in the first suit. Dunn v.
Kelly, 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Brigham Young Law Review. - Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937, 945.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 301 et seq.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 287 et seq.
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A.L.R. - Statute permitting new action, after failure of original action commenced within
period of limitation, as applicable in cases
where original action failed for lack of jurisdiction, 6 A.L.R.3d 1043.
Applicability, as affected by change in parties, of statute permitting commencement of
new action within specified time after failure
of prior action not on merits, 13 A.L.R.3d 848.
Effect of statute permitting new action to be

78-12-41.

brought within specified period after failure of
original action other than on the merits to
limit period of limitations, 13 A.L.R.3d 979.
Application to period of limitations fixed by
contract, of statute permitting new action to be
brought within specified time after failure of
prior action for cause other than on the merits,
16 A.L.R.3d 452.
Key Numbers. - Limitations of Actions e=>
130.

Effect of injunction

or prohibition.

When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a statutory
prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-41.

Cross-References.
Rule 65A, U.R.C.P.

- Injunctions, § 78-3-4;

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions §§ 170, 171.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§§ 253, 254.

78-12-42.

Disability
crues.

Key Numbers. 111.

Limitation of Actions

e=>

must exist when right of action ac-

No person can avail himself of a disability, unless it existed when his right
of action accrued.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-42.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 179.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitatio.ns of Actions
§ 216.

78-12-43.

All disabilities

Key Numbers. 70(1).

Limitation of Actions

e=>

must be removed.

When two or more disabilities coexist at the time the right of action accrues,
the limitation does not attach until all are removed.
History:· L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-43.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51.Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 178.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 220.

78-12-44.

Key Numbers. 77.

Limitation of Actions

Effect of payment, acknowledgment,
to pay.

ea,

or promise

In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest
shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or
claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an action may
be brought within the period prescribed for the same after such payment,
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in
writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby. When a right of action is
barred by the provisions of any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a
cause of action or ground of defense.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-44.

Cross-References.

§ 70A-2-201.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Acknowledgment or promise.
-Acknowledgment
alone.
-Acknowledgment
to stranger.
-Action against corporation.
-Admission of liability.
-Amount of claim.
-Bankruptcy.
-Conditions or contingencies.
-Denial of indebtedness.
-Direct and unqualified admission.
-Intention
to pay. noh -Language.
-Letter by endorser.
-Letter by note maker.
-New promise.
-Option to purchase.
-Pleading.
-Stating of account.
Burden of proof.
-Defendant.
Consideration.
-Moral obligation.
-Original debt.
"Contract."
-Judgment.
-Merger of contract into judgment.
Estoppel.
-Trust deed.
Evidence.
-Testimony of plaintiff.
Mortgage debt.
-Extension by mortgagee.
Payment.
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-By assignee.
-By mortgagor.
-Part payment.
-Taxes on mortgaged property.
Verbal agreement.

Acknowledgment

or promise.

-Acknowledgment
alone.
An acknowledgment alone is sufficient to
toll statute; it is unnecessary that acknowledgment be accompanied by a promise to pay;
word "or" cannot be construed as "and." Weir
v. Bauer, 75 Utah 498, 286 P. 936 (1930).
It is sufficient if there be in writing either an
acknowledgment of existing liability or a
promise to pay; both are not necessary. Salt
Lake Trans. Co. v. Shurtliff, 83 Utah 488, 30
P.2d 733, (1934).
-Acknowledgment
to stranger.
Written acknowledgment of existing liability, signed by party to be charged, is sufficient
to stop running of statute; but it is otherwise as
to acknowledgment to stranger, not intended
to be communicated to creditor. Weir v. Bauer,
75 Utah 498, 286 P. 936 (1930).
-Action against corporation.
In action by bondholder against corporation
to foreclose trust deed securing bonds, it was
held that annual reports of defendant company, income tax reports, etc., did not toll statute. Weir v. Bauer, 75 Utah 498, 286 P. 936
(1930).
Vice president, secretary or general manager
of a private corporation may not, without express authority, bind his company by acknowledgment or promise so as to prevent bar of the
statute. Salt Lake Valley Loan & Trust Co. v.
St. Joseph Land Co., 73 Utah 256, 273 P. 507
(1928).
-Admission
of liability.
A mere acknowledgment of an existing liability is insufficient to revive the debt, but no
set phrase or particular form of language is
required. Anything that will indicate that the
party making the acknowledgment admits that
he is still liable on the claim is sufficient to
revive the debt. O'Donnell v. Parker, 48 Utah
578, 160 P. 1192 (1916).
-Amount of claim.
This statute is satisfied by the acknowledgment of a claim and it does not require that the
amount of the claim be acknowledged or that
the claim be liquidated. Beck v. Dutchman Coalition Mines Co., 2 Utah 2d 104, 269 P.2d 867
(1954).
-Bankruptcy.
Merely scheduling a claim in petition in
bankruptcy does not operate to waive the statute of limitations, or constitute an acknowledg-

ment that will revive the debt. O'Donnell v.
Parker, 48 Utah 578, 160 P. 1192 (1916).

-Conditions or contingencies.
Under former statute, promise sufficient to
create new or continuing contract and to remove bar of statute was required to be express,
clear, and unequivocal; if there were any conditions or contingency annexed, proof was required to show that such conditions had been
performed and such contingency had happened, so as to raise qualified promise into one
which was absolute and unqualified. Kuhn v.
Mount, 13 Utah 108, 44 P. 1036 (1896).
-Denial of indebtedness.
Letter from defendant to plaintiff held denial
that defendant was indebted to plaintiff in any
sum at time of letter's date, rather than acknowledgment of and promise to pay amount
formerly owing to plaintiff by defendant.
Thomas v. Glendinning, 13 Utah 47, 44 P. 652
(1896).
-Direct and unqualified admission.
Acknowledgment from which by implication
of law promise is to be raised ought to be direct
and unqualified admission of previous, subsisting debt for which debtor is liable and which he
intends to pay. Kuhn v. Mount, 13 Utah 108,
44 P. 1036 (1896).
-Intention to pay.
Where promise or acknowledgment raises at
best - because vague and indeterminate mere probable inference of intention to pay,
and may affect minds of different persons differently, it should not be held sufficient to evidence new cause of action. Kuhn v. Mount, 13
Utah 108, 44 P. 1036 (1896).
-Language.
What constitutes an acknowledgment or
promise in writing depends, of course, upon the
language thereof. Boukofsky v. Powers, 1 Utah
333 (1876).
-Letter by endorser.
Letters by endorsers on note to effect that
they would no longer be liable for their endorsements because of unreasonable delay in
bringing action against maker and letter expressing surprise that interest was not paid
and stating that endorser would put pressure
on maker, held, not acknowledgment under
former section. Salt Lake Transf. Co. v.
Shurtliff, 83 Utah 488, 30 P.2d 733 (1934).
-Letter by note maker.
Under former statute, held that letters writ-
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ten by maker of note to payees thereof contained, not only admission of, but also promise
to pay, debt evidenced by note, and, under evidence, etc., were sufficient to remove bar of
statute. Kuhn v. Mount, 13 Utah 108, 44 P.
1036 (1896).

-New promise.
A written acknowledgment of an indebtedness upon open account, already barred, and a
promise in writing to pay the same, contained
in a letter from debtor to creditor, becomes a
new promise in writing, and will not be barred
until) four years from date of new promise.
Gruenberg v. Buhring, 5 Utah 414, 16 P. 486
(1888).
New promise does not revive barred obligation, but creates new obligation which, in its
turn, is subject to bar of time as original promise. Ireland v. Mackintosh, 22 Utah 296, 61 P.
901 (1900). For eomment unfavorable to result
reached in this case, see 14 Harv. L. Rev., p.
229.
-Option to purchase.
Acknowledgment made by debtor in option
to purchase its property was held to be sufficient to toll statute where option was signed
and specifically referred to debt or obligation
and the amount thereof. Weir v. Bauer, 75
Utah 498, 286 P. 936 (1930).
-Pleading.
It is questionable whether acknowledgment
in writing under this section applies to any liability other than one founded on contract, but
in any event the acknowledgment must be
made before statute has run and the same
pleaded to show tolling of statute, or if made
after statute has run, such acknowledgment
must be pleaded as basis of action. Attorney
Gen. v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277,
114 A.L.R. 726 (1937).
-Stating of account.
Stating of account between the parties will
not take case out of statute, unless such stating
is "in writing, signed by the party to be
charged thereby." Anthony & Co. v. Savage, 2
Utah 466 (1877).
Burden of proof.
-Defendant.
Defendant has burden, in order to avoid effect of acknowledgment of and promise to pay
debt, to show that writings, containing such
acknowledgment and promise, referred to debt
other than one sued on. Kuhn v. Mount, 13
Utah 108, 44 P. 1036 (1896).
Consideration.
-Moral obligation.
In order for a contract to be valid and binding, each party must be bound to give some
legal consideration to the other by conferring a
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benefit upon him or suffering a legal detriment
at his request, and a moral obligation cannot
constitute a valid consideration. Manwill v.
Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961).

-Original debt.
A debt within the statutory bar is ·a good
consideration for a new promise, although
made by an agent, if within the scope of his
powers. Leavitt v. Oxford & Geneva Silver
Mining Co., 3 Utah 265, 1 P. 356 (1883).
Original debt is sufficient consideration in
law to support new contract, but promise ought
not to have effect of creating such new contract
unless it is distinct admission of debtor's obligation to pay debt. Kuhn v. Mount, 13 Utah
108, 44 P. 1036 (1896).
"Contract."
-Judgment.
Since an action on a judgment (at common
law) would not lie in assumpsit, and since this
section applies only to contracts based on a
promise enforceable in assumpsit, a judgment
is not a "contract" within meaning of this section. Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402
P.2d 696 (1965).
-Merger of contract into judgment.
Where a judgment was entered in favor of
creditor in action founded on contract, the debt
did not thereafter retain its original character
as a contract de'\it, but a new cause of action on
the judgment was substituted, the contract was
merged into such judgment, and this section
was inapplicable to extend the limitation period within which an action to renew the judgment could be brought. Yergensen v. Ford, 16
Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (1965).
Estoppel.
-Trust deed.
Under former section, defendant corporation
and majority stockholder could be estopped
from asserting bar of statute of limitations in
action by minority stockholder to foreclose
trust deed given to secure bonds, executed by
defendant company. Weir v. Bauer, 75 Utah
498, 286 P. 936 (1930).
Evidence.
-Testimony of plaintiff.
In action on rejected claim against esta~e of
defendant's intestate, defended on ground statute of limitations had run, testimony of plaintiff that defendant's intestate promised to care
for graves of plaintiffs children and let value
of such services apply on his indebtedness to
plaintiff was insufficient to toll statute, where
35 years had elapsed since indebtedness sued
on in action was incurred. Hawkley v. Heaton,
54 Utah 314, 180 P. 440 (1919).
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Mortgage debt.
-Extension
by mortgagee.
Extension of time of payment by mortgagee
by receipt of part payment or new promise by
mortgagee, which has effect of reviving debt or
extending time of payment, will not be binding
on junior claimant without his consent so as to
affect his right successfully to interpose bar of
statute, if such extensions are made after he
has acquired his interest in mortgaged premises\ Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104
P. 117, 26 L.R.A. (n.s.) 898 (1909).
Payment.
-By assignee.
Payment made by an assignee for benefit of
creditors of assignor does not of itself toll the
statute. Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 Utah 387, 45
P.2d 565, 98 A.L.R. 1006 (1935).
-By mortgagor.
Payments on mortgage by mortgagor or his
authorized agent preclude payor from claiming
that mortgage is barred by statute of limitations. Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d
242 (1931).
-Part payment.
Part payment of either principal or interest
fOLLATERAL
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 325 et seq.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 316.
A.L.R. - Promises to settle or perform as
estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 44
A.L.R.3d 482.
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by one of two or more joint and several obligors
does not of itself suspend the running of the
statute of limitations against the other co-obligors. Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 Utah 387, 45 P.2d
565, 98 A.L.R. 1006 (1935).
Where plaintiffs right to recover certain
money deposited with defendant had been
barred for more than twelve years by statute of
limitations at time this section was adopted,
subsequent payment of a small sum by defendant did not revive plaintiffs right to sue.
Francis v. Gisborn, 30 Utah 67, 83 P. 571
(1905).
-Taxes on mortgaged property.
Payment of taxes on mortgaged property, by
mortgagor, in accordance with provision of
mortgage, did not constitute a "payment" on
principal amount of mortgagor's obligation,
within meaning of former § 104-2-45, so as to
toll statute of limitations in regard to mortgage. Upton v. Heiselt Constr. Co., 116 Utah
83, 208 P.2d 945 (1949).
Verbal agreement.
A verbal agreement or new promise based
upon a prior agreement barred by statute
comes within this section. Whitehill v. Lowe,
10 Utah 419, 37 P. 589 (1894) (decided under
prior law).
REFERENCES
Promises or attempts by seller to repair
goods as tolling statute of limitations for
breach of warranty, 68 A.L.R.3d 1277.
Key Numbers. - Limitations of Actions e=>
146.

Action barred in another state barred here.

When a cause of action has arisen in another state or territory, or in a
foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon
shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who
has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the
time it accrued.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-45.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
-Counterclaim.
--Act
occurring in other state.
Choice of laws.
-Utah court.
Exception to section.
-Assignee of resident's claim.
-State resident.
--Accrual
of cause of action.

Applicability

of section.

(Utah 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.
Ct. 397, 70 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1981).

-Counterclaim.
--Act
occurring in other state.
Where defendant's counterclaim for malpractice occurri'ng in Idaho was barred by the
Idaho statute of limitation, it would be barred
here under this section. Lindsay v. Woodward,
5 Utah 2d 183, 299 P.2d 619 (1956).
Choice of laws.
-Utah court.
In wrongful death action by Utah resident
against Colorado residents, in which Utah
court had quasi in rem jurisdiction, Utah court
applied Utah law on matter concerning the
statute of limitations, including the tolling
thereof. Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343,

Exception to section.
-Assignee
of resident's claim.
Resident of Utah, who acquired claim upon
which he based his right of action by virtue of
assignment after cause of action had accrued
thereon, did not come within exception to this
section. Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P. 520
(1908).
-State

resident.

--Accrual
of cause of action.
Only those persons who are Utah residents
as of the date their cause of action arises come
within the exception to this section. Allen v.
Greyhound Lines, 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 66 et seq.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 31.
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"Action" includes

Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions
169.

,g:,

special proceeding.

The word "action," as used in this chapter, is to be construed, whenever it is
necessary to do so, as including a special proceeding of a civil nature.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-46.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Special proceeding.
Proceeding by tax commission for appointment of administrator to collect and pay inheritance taxes upon estate which had been held
in joint tenancy with right of survivorship was
a "special proceeding of a civil nature." In re
Swan's Estate, 95 Utah 408, 79 P.2d 999
(1938).
A "special proceeding" applies to proceedings

in courts of justice or quasi-judicial bodies in
which the rights of parties thereto are determined, but which proceedings were not known
as common-law actions or proceedings in equity. A summary proceeding to seize and sell a
car does not constitute an action. Crystal Car
Line v. State Tax .Comm'n, 110 Utah 426, 174
P.2d 984 (1946).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 81.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 3; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 296.
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Key Numbers. 3(1), 131.

Limitation of Actions

"'°

Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in
malpractice actions.

In any action against a physician and surgeon, dentist, osteopathic physician, chiropractor, physical therapist, registered nurse, clinical laboratory
bioanalyst, clinical laboratory technologist, or a licensed hospital, person,
firm or corporation as the employer of any such person for professional negligence or for rendering professional services without consent, if the responsive
pleading of the defendant pleads that the action is barred by the statute of
limitations, and if either party so moves the court, the issue raised thereby
may be tried separately and before any other issues in the case are tried. If the
issue raised by the defense of the statute of limitations is finally determined
in favor of the plaintiff, the remaining issues shall then be tried.
This act shall not be construed to be retroactive.
History: C. 1953, 78-12-47, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 212, § 2.
Meaning of "this act". - The phrase "this
act," appearing in the second paragraph, refers

to Laws 1971, Chapter 212, which enacted this
section and amended § 78-12-28.
Cross-References. - Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, limitation section, § 78-14-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Summary judgment.
The statute of limitations issue in a medical
malpractice action may be disposed of by sum-

mary judgment ifno genuine issues of material
fact are raised. Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93
(Utah 1982).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions §§ 487, 488.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 398.

Key Numbers. 176 et seq.

Limitation of Actions

"'°

CHAPTER 13
PLACE OF TRIAL
VENUE
Section
78-13-1.
78-13-2.
78-13-3.
78-13-4.
78-13-5.
78-13-6.

Actions respecting real property.
Actions to recover fines or penalties
- Against public officers.
Actions against a county.
Actions on written contracts.
Transitory actions - Residence of
corporations.
Arising without this state in favor
of resident.

Section
78-13-7.
78-13-8.

All other actions.
Change of venue - Conditions
precedent.
78-13-9. Grounds.
78-13-10. Court to which transfer is to be
made.
78-13-11. Duty of clerk - Fees and costs Effect on jurisdiction.
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